Kazakhstan might want to consider adjusting its multivector doctrine to buttress its sovereignty in an era of great uncertainty.

Often depicted as a prisoner of geography, Kazakhstan has tailored a foreign policy known as the multivector doctrine. By maintaining positive relations with many states (especially, but not limited to, the Great Powers of Russia and China), officials have worked to preserve Kazakhstan’s sovereignty.  

Multivectorism amounts to “hedging” without expressly antagonizing more powerful countries, but it works best under limited competition. Perhaps, though, it needs updating.  

Talk of a return to an era typified by “spheres of influence” and “conquest” is concerning. The next few years are crucial, as Russia rebuilds it military, strives to enhance its leverage over Kazakhstan, and possibly tries to build a supranational state. Russia’s transforming of Belarus into a “vassal state” should be setting off alarms in Ak Orda, the presidential palace. So, how might Kazakhstan try to revise its multivector doctrine? 

The country’s leaders would benefit by initially agreeing on several guiding assumptions. First, Russia’s revisionism and continued war of aggression against Ukraine could pose a danger. Russia’s nuclear threat posturing, targeting of civilians, and refusal to agree to a full ceasefire should lead Astana to assume that Moscow does not really seek peace with Kyiv. The current partial ceasefire for energy infrastructure sites is very shaky.  

Russia’s war presents a hazard to Kazakhstan. It is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which Moscow could call upon in the future if the war expands. The Kremlin’s war also poses a challenge for Kazakhstan’s economy — heavily dependent on coal, oil and gas exports — and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium has previously been caught in the crosshairs of this armed conflict. 

Second, Kazakhstan’s officials should assume that the Kremlin intends to build a supranational state. Russia’s plan to “absorb” Belarus by 2030 (according to a leaked document), Minsk and Moscow’s enactment of the Union State treaty in March, and former Russian presidential aide Vladislav Surkov’s recent statement that the ideology of the “Russian world” is borderless, signal that Moscow intends to construct such an entity.  

Third, Kazakhstan should not believe its own hype. It is not a “middle power,” and its officials should appreciate their state’s limitations.  

Fourth, Kazakhstan’s leadership should assume that Russia will continue issuing veiled threats. They should not dismiss such acts as the deranged ramblings of former Russian leaders or provocateurs’ musings. If Astana tailors strategies based on this set of assumptions, then perhaps Kazakhstan can buttress its sovereignty. 

The country is attracting foreign investment and hopes to keep increasing its oil exports via the BTC pipeline. It has also hosted military exercises with Turkic nations and provided some relief aid to Ukraine. Astana does not acknowledge “quasi-state entities” such as the renegade Donetsk and Luhansk statelets. On April 26, 2023, Kazakhstan voted in favor of a United Nations resolution that labeled Russia’s actions against Ukraine and Georgia beforehand as “aggression.” It is also well aware of its dependency on Russian arms, and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has stressed the need to lessen the reliance on foreign defense products. 

Astana should also consider enacting more strident policies. Kazakhstan could move to further diversify arms imports, ensure its stricter adherence to the Western sanctions regime against Russia, increase its relief aid funding to Ukraine, and more vociferously condemn Russia’s aggression (such as by clarifying that previous Kremlin-friendly statements on Russia’s illegal seizure and annexation of Crimea do not reflect its actual position). It could also loudly criticize all talk of a return to spheres of influence.  

Additionally, the government may wish to organize a national conversation (perhaps culminating with a referendum) around the topic of possibly leaving the CSTO and embracing neutrality. But most significantly, the leadership could replace the “highly personalist ruling system” of the Nazarbayev era with genuine democratic institutions. Enacting some of these proposals, though, would revise the essence of Kazakhstan’s multivector doctrine, namely by accenting “balancing” (and placing lesser value on hedging) against Russia. 

Kazakhstan’s government may reason that it is wisest to sit quiet and keep a tight lid on civil society, so as to avoid having to suppress another popular uprising (or apparent coup attempt by an elite faction) like during Bloody January of 2022.  

Russia will eventually have a new leadership, they might argue. So, why should Kazakhstan, during a time of economic and infrastructural challenges, risk longstanding commercial interests, anger pro-Russian segments of the population, and provoke the Kremlin? Why try to build a democracy in a country that has no prior history, and when Western values are ostensibly in retreat? Kazakhstan’s sovereignty is not in peril like in Georgia or Ukraine, so why should Astana switch from hedging to balancing? 

All these concerns are rational. By concurring with them, officials would be admitting that — in the hopes of buttressing Kazakhstan’s sovereignty — the inherent risks of updating the government’s acclaimed multivector doctrine (by switching from a hedging agenda to a more spirited balancing approach vis-à-vis Russia) outweigh the potential benefits, at least at this time.  

Yet if such reasoning prevails, then Kazakhstan may soon be struggling like Belarus. Astana finds itself between a hawk and a buzzard as it contemplates how to deal with Russia. 

Kazakhstan needs to realize that the continued success of its hedging-centric approach is predicated on Russia behaving as a status quo power. This seems like a bad assumption to make. 

Charles J. Sullivan, PhD is a scholar on Central Asia. Dr. Sullivan is the author of Leaders of the Nation: Kazakhstan during the Twilight of the Nazarbayev Era and the Russo-Ukrainian War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2025). He has published in academic journals such as Asian Security, Asia Policy, Asian Affairs, Nationalities Papers, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, and Strategic Analysis. The opinions expressed here are the author’s own. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

Source - https://cepa.org

03.04.2025 07:00