In September 2022, Azerbaijan’s attack on the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia along three directions not only called into question but effectively destroyed the security system Armenia had been building within the framework of the CSTO since gaining independence. Having officially appealed to the CSTO for military assistance and received no support, Armenia’s leadership was forced to seek alternative security guarantees, effectively opening the region to new global and regional players.

This necessity was also driven by military losses: as a result of the 44-day war, Armenia lost a significant amount of equipment and was in urgent need of critical weaponry, which it could no longer purchase from its traditional supplier — Russia. For many years, Moscow had supplied Yerevan with arms at preferential prices, but being heavily involved in the war in Ukraine, Russia itself faced a shortage of weapons and began actively purchasing them from other countries — including North Korea and Iran.

Nevertheless, CSTO membership became a serious obstacle to expanding Armenia’s military and political cooperation with other partners. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan openly stated that many countries were ready to sell weapons to Armenia, but CSTO participation limited those opportunities. This likely referred primarily to France, which seeks to weaken Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus. In an effort to ensure urgent arms and ammunition deliveries, Armenia effectively froze its participation in CSTO summits and exercises, although it has not formally withdrawn from the organization.

Reorientation Toward New Military Alliances

In October 2023, Armenia signed a major military cooperation agreement with France, which included the purchase of Bastion armored vehicles, GM200 radars, night vision devices, PGM sniper rifles, and Mistral air defense systems. Paris also pledged to assist Yerevan in training personnel — providing instructors, military advisors, and educational programs. By June 2024, a new agreement was announced with France for the supply of CAESAR self-propelled howitzers.

Even more active is Armenia’s cooperation with India. Since 2021, Yerevan has been purchasing Indian artillery and air defense systems, becoming the largest buyer of Indian weapons. Among the supplies are Pinaka multiple rocket launchers, Akash surface-to-air missiles, MArG 155 self-propelled howitzers, as well as body armor and helmets. Thanks to these contracts, the South Caucasus has become a new market for India’s defense industry, and Armenia — the first post-Soviet country to receive several of India’s latest weapons systems.

In December 2023, Yerevan deepened cooperation with Greece by signing an agreement on military-technical interaction. In spring 2024, the defense ministers of Armenia and Greece discussed the possibility of creating a quadrilateral format — Armenia, Greece, France, and India. Later, on France’s initiative, Greece transferred S-300 systems and other types of Russian-made weapons to Armenia.

Meanwhile, Armenia is also expanding ties with the United States: Defense Minister Suren Papikyan held a “historic meeting” with his American counterpart, emphasizing the intention to deepen cooperation. For the third consecutive year, Armenia has participated in the U.S.-Armenian military exercises Eagle Partner, while simultaneously boycotting CSTO events. De facto, Yerevan has exited the Russian-led collective security system, reaching what officials have called a “point of no return”.

A New Security Architecture or New Vulnerabilities?

Despite the active expansion of military partnerships, it is still too early to say that Armenia’s defense capability has significantly strengthened.
Imports of weapons from France, India, and China, as well as the involvement of instructors from these countries, create a risk of organizational disarray. Different schools of military thought and incompatible weapons systems could lead to chaos in command, especially during combat operations. Senior officers trained in the Russian military doctrine and younger soldiers trained by foreign instructors may end up being “on different wavelengths”, threatening disruptions in the chain of command and coordination.

Russia’s Reaction and New Geopolitical Risks

Armenia’s growing military ties with Western partners are being viewed ambiguously, especially in Moscow. Russia has so far refrained from taking harsh measures — likely due to its involvement in the war in Ukraine. However, economic countermeasures are already visible: the Russian market is becoming increasingly inaccessible for Armenian goods.

The South Caucasus remains a strategically vital region for Russia, and it is unlikely that Moscow will simply give up its influence there. Losing the region could pose a destabilization risk to Russia’s own North Caucasus. Therefore, one can expect Moscow to continue seeking ways to restrain Armenia — including coordination with Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as influence over Armenia’s domestic politics through its agents and its military base in Gyumri.

The Corridor Through Syunik: A New Threat to Stability

Following the war, the issue of a transport corridor through Syunik has gained special importance — a route vital for the Turkey-Azerbaijan tandem. The so-called “Zangezur corridor” is meant to connect Azerbaijan’s western regions with Nakhchivan and further with Turkey, opening a gateway to the Turkic world. Its implementation could radically change the balance of power in the region — turning Ankara and Baku into key players on the line from Central Asia to the Mediterranean.

Under the threat of war and the pressure of a prolonged blockade, Armenia — through U.S. mediation — agreed to grant Azerbaijan unhindered access to Nakhchivan, as stipulated in the preliminary peace declaration signed in Washington in the summer of 2025.

This initiative has caused serious concern in Iran, which has traditionally maintained friendly relations with Armenia. In Tehran, the project is seen as a U.S. attempt to encircle Iran from the north. Calls have even been made on the Iranian side to prevent the opening of the corridor by military means. Despite reassurances made during the Iranian president’s visit to Yerevan, regular military exercises along the Araks River demonstrate Tehran’s high level of anxiety.

U.S. sponsorship of the “Zangezur corridor” also contradicts Russia’s interests, since under the trilateral agreement of November 9, 2020, control over the route was supposed to belong to Moscow.

Between Old Alliances and New Challenges

Failing to strike a balance among the interests of various power centers, Armenia risks losing its old allies without gaining reliable new ones. The South Caucasus is a region where any shift in equilibrium can lead to unpredictable consequences. Over the past three years, the steps taken by Armenia’s leadership to reorient its security policy have opened new opportunities but also created new threats to sovereignty.

Whether Armenia will manage to build a truly sustainable defense system and find a balance among external actors remains to be seen. One thing is clear: the country faces an enormous task of modernizing its armed forces and harmonizing the interests of its foreign partners to ensure that its new course does not become the source of new crises.

Specialist in politico-military and security affairs,

Hovhannes Vardanyan

#ARMENIA

18.10.2025 11:22