Serbia, the largest country in the Western Balkans, is facing a historic choice regarding its future political orientation. Although this decision has been on the agenda since the late 1990s, it remains unresolved and is likely to stay so for some time. The country is undergoing a process of transformation; however, without integration into Western institutions – above all, the European Union – this transformation remains incomplete. Other major international actors, particularly Russia and to some extent China, are attempting to influence Belgrade in directions that serve their strategic interests.

A rational choice regarding economic integration, trade, investment, and the consolidation of democracy should naturally steer Serbia toward the West. However, as various examples demonstrate, rationality is not the only factor at play. Emotional ties with Russia, Orthodox Christianity, Russian support for Serbia in the Kosovo dispute, and Moscow's sophisticated influence – often amplified by the EU’s slow and hesitant approach – enable Russia to maintain a strong position in Serbia. This has led to a stalemate that requires urgent attention to avoid prolonged uncertainty and indecision.

China, meanwhile, offers a potential alternative, primarily as a trading partner and investor. However, its interests in Serbia's future orientation may diverge from those of Moscow, not least due to China's contemporary international rhetoric. Given these dynamics, one can observe a gradual shift in Serbia’s political course.

This article analyzes the current state of Serbia’s European integration process. It examines institutional, political, and socio-cultural factors that slow down negotiations with the European Union. Particular attention is paid to the Kosovo issue, the influence of external actors (Russia and China), and the dynamics of public opinion. The article also presents data on public support for EU membership among the Serbian population.

Contradictory signals continue to emerge from Belgrade regarding the possibility of reorienting its foreign policy from Russia toward the European Union. There is a domestic consensus in favor of maintaining the EU path and commitment to European integration. On the other hand, Serbia has refused to impose sanctions on Russia, primarily due to deeply rooted historical grievances – most notably the NATO bombings of the 1990s and Western support for Kosovo’s independence. Russia (alongside China) continues to defend Serbia's territorial integrity at the United Nations and other international forums.

Serbia effectively finds itself a hostage of the broader Russia–West confrontation. It is compelled to present different positions depending on whether it is engaging with European or Russian representatives. Thus, from Moscow’s perspective, Serbia is a partner whose loyalty is largely contingent on the state of Russia’s relations with the West and developments in Ukraine. Serbia’s position on the Ukraine conflict is itself ambiguous: while Belgrade supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity – reflecting its own concerns over Kosovo’s status – it simultaneously avoids aligning fully with Western sanctions or rhetoric.

One of the key obstacles to Serbia’s EU accession remains the Kosovo question. Brussels has consistently emphasized that normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina is a prerequisite for further progress in EU accession talks. However, the Serbian political elite is unwilling to make compromises that a significant portion of the public would perceive as a betrayal of national interests. This issue largely accounts for the stagnation of the negotiation process and contributes to the image of Serbia as a country oscillating between a European course and a nationalist agenda.

Public opinion also plays a crucial role. According to a survey I conducted in 2025 as part of this research, only 33% of Serbian citizens support EU membership, while over 40% are opposed, and around a quarter remain undecided. For comparison, support for EU accession in Albania and North Macedonia exceeds 80%, highlighting regional disparities in perceptions of the EU. Data from the International Republican Institute (IRI) in 2024 similarly reflect this polarization: 40% of Serbians expressed support for European integration, while 34-43% opposed it. These findings confirm a high degree of societal polarization, which complicates the implementation of reforms and reduces the Serbian government’s political flexibility.

External actors also play a significant role. Russia and China have been actively strengthening their economic and political presence in Serbia, investing in infrastructure, energy, and technology. These countries are perceived by a significant segment of the Serbian population as viable alternatives to the EU, thereby reducing Belgrade’s dependence on Brussels. Notably, Serbia’s alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) stood at approximately 47% in 2024, underscoring the limited degree of conformity with EU foreign policy expectations.

Domestic political dynamics further hinder integration. The European Commission’s annual reports consistently point to shortcomings in the rule of law, pressure on independent media, and the concentration of power in the executive branch. According to several experts, elements of "managed democracy" are becoming increasingly evident in Serbia, directly conflicting with the Copenhagen criteria that underpin EU accession. This situation not only diminishes the EU's willingness to accelerate negotiations but also reinforces perceptions within Serbia that the EU applies "double standards".

In conclusion, Serbia's prospects for EU membership are shaped by a complex interplay of interrelated factors: the unresolved Kosovo issue, declining public support for accession, the influence of Russia and China, and weak institutional reforms. The most likely scenario for the coming years is a continuation of the current stagnation in negotiations, despite the formal maintenance of a pro-EU orientation. However, a breakthrough remains possible if the Serbian leadership demonstrates political will to resolve the Kosovo dispute and strengthen democratic institutions – and if the European Union offers clearer guarantees and a concrete timeline for accession. Failing that, growing uncertainty could further deepen Serbia’s ties with Russia and China, entrenching its position as a "country between two worlds" and postponing EU integration indefinitely.

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21.10.2025 01:47