The South Caucasus and the Caspian region are emerging as key arenas for India’s expanding influence. New Delhi is leveraging their unique geographic position as a bridge between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This growing interest is driven by the intersection of strategic transport corridors, access to abundant energy resources, and a complex geopolitical dynamic where global and regional powers compete for dominance.

According to an analytical report by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) published in October 2025, India is prioritizing the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which passes through Iran, to secure an alternative trade route to Europe — bypassing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This strategy allows New Delhi to reduce reliance on vulnerable maritime routes such as the Red Sea, where Houthi attacks in 2024 disrupted over 2,000 vessels and significantly increased shipping costs.

The Caspian region, rich in oil and gas, holds strategic importance for India. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have become key partners as major energy suppliers. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), India is increasing investments in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), known as the “Middle Corridor,” which links China to Europe through the Caspian Sea. This strengthens economic ties while counterbalancing China’s dominance in Eurasian logistics. In August 2025, The Diplomat highlighted India’s promotion of the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) as an alternative to the BRI, intensifying regional competition.

Transport corridor expert Shota Gabisonia notes: “The Middle Corridor is a reincarnation of the Silk Road, where Georgia can regain its status as a regional hub, while competition stimulates infrastructure investment”.

The South Caucasus — comprising Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan — has become India’s testing ground for implementing an ambitious geopolitical strategy. Fragile peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which made progress in August 2025 under U.S. mediation, provide New Delhi an opportunity to strengthen its position under the Global South framework through platforms such as BRICS and the SCO. However, potential conflict escalation — particularly around Nagorno-Karabakh and the Zangezur Corridor — poses challenges for Indian diplomacy, which seeks to balance economic opportunities with regional stability. Corridors like TITR allow India to mitigate dependence on Russian energy, especially following U.S. sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil on October 22, 2025, which affected over 5% of global oil production.

India and Armenia: A Military–Strategic Alliance

India–Armenia cooperation reached unprecedented levels in 2025, becoming a cornerstone of New Delhi’s Eurasian strategy. The main areas include arms supplies, military training, and technological collaboration. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for 2020–2024, India remains one of the world’s largest arms importers, emphasizing diversification of suppliers. It exported artillery systems, radars, and air-defense assets to Armenia worth around $600 million, including a $40 million contract for Swathi radar systems in 2024–2025.

Although global major arms transfers declined by 0.6% between 2015–2019 and 2020–2024, India retained its leading importer status (9.8% of the global share), underscoring its growing role in regional alliances. According to The Diplomat (August 2025), Indian military instructors conducted training for Armenian officers in India, focusing on tactics, cybersecurity, and drone operations. Joint projects in drone and AI development — reported by Indian defense outlets — further solidify technological cooperation.

India’s motives are clear: establishing a foothold in Eurasia and counterbalancing the China–Pakistan axis. Armenia serves as a counterweight to the Pakistan–Turkey–Azerbaijan alliance, which in 2025 held joint military exercises and reaffirmed support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, as noted by the Usanas Foundation (June 13, 2025). Armenia supports India’s stance on Kashmir, while New Delhi expresses solidarity with Yerevan on Nagorno-Karabakh.

Military expert Gigla Inashvili observes: “India’s assistance to Armenia is a response to Turkish–Pakistani backing of Baku, but without dominance”.

Armenia also serves as India’s entry point to the Caspian region. According to Arab News (August 12, 2025), New Delhi is investing in the INSTC through Iran’s Chabahar Port, expanding its economic footprint. However, this has caused friction with Azerbaijan, which — as Azerbaijani officials stated in May 2025 — expressed discontent with India’s arms supplies to Armenia. The partnership allows India to test alternative energy routes, reducing exposure to sanctions affecting Russian suppliers.

Regional Balance: Reactions of Key Players

India’s growing presence in the South Caucasus has triggered mixed reactions. Russia, traditionally dominant through the CSTO, views the India–Armenia rapprochement as a challenge. Newsweek (September 2025) reports that Moscow is deepening ties with Iran to counter Western and Indian influence. Armenia’s withdrawal from CSTO exercises in August 2024, according to Caliber.az, underscores its desire to diversify partnerships while maintaining a cautious balance with Russia.

U.S. sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil (October 22, 2025), reported by Reuters, have weakened Moscow’s economic influence in the Caucasus, creating a dilemma for India — a major buyer of Russian oil — due to risks of restricted dollar transactions. This pushes New Delhi to accelerate diversification via INSTC and IMEC.

Turkey, Azerbaijan’s key ally, has reacted negatively to India’s support for Armenia, particularly regarding the Zangezur Corridor. The Atlantic Council (October 1, 2025) notes that Ankara is strengthening its presence in Central Asia by promoting the Middle Corridor as an alternative to IMEC. The Turkey–Azerbaijan–Pakistan alliance, with joint exercises and mutual backing over Kashmir, poses what the Yorktown Institute (June 30, 2025) describes as a “new strategic threat” to India.

Iran, India’s partner in the INSTC, faces a dilemma: while supporting Armenia enhances New Delhi’s position, a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, according to the Gulf International Forum (September 19, 2025), could undermine Tehran’s leverage. U.S. sanctions on Russia create opportunities for Iranian energy exports but also intensify competition over INSTC and IMEC. Anadolu Agency (July 2025) warns that excluding Turkey and Iran from IMEC drives them to promote competing corridors through the Caucasus.

The West welcomes India’s presence as a means of reducing Russian and Iranian dominance. The Armenian Weekly (October 2025) reports that the United States is advancing a “Trump Corridor” as an alternative to Russian and Iranian routes. The European Union, according to the LSE (May 28, 2025), is increasing its focus on the Black Sea region, supporting projects that complement INSTC and IMEC.

U.S.–India energy talks on October 16, 2025, as reported by the Economic Times, discussed diversification in light of sanctions on Russia. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio (October 26, 2025) confirmed that closer U.S.–Pakistan ties would not harm India, reaffirming the strategic partnership. A Pew Research Center survey (June 2025) recorded high pro-U.S. sentiment in India, while defense and technology cooperation continues to deepen.

Conclusion

India is consolidating its position as a new balancing power in Eurasia, combining economic initiatives, military cooperation, and diplomatic maneuvering. The partnership with Armenia grants New Delhi access to the region but demands caution amid persistent conflicts. U.S. sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil weaken Russia’s presence in the Caucasus, creating space for Indo–Western initiatives. As Project Syndicate (July 31, 2025) notes, the transactional nature of U.S.–India relations and sanctions pressure drive New Delhi toward diversification — with the South Caucasus emerging as a critical link.

An optimistic scenario envisions the integration of the Caucasus into the INSTC, fostering trade under Western support. A pessimistic one involves renewed escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Indian arms supplies to Armenia could provoke Turkey and Azerbaijan, especially amid Russia’s weakened position. The Vivekananda International Foundation (August 2025) emphasizes the fragility of peace but views India as a stabilizing force — provided it pursues a multi-vector policy.

U.S. sanctions are reshaping the Eurasian landscape, with India emerging as a key actor balancing interests and risks. The South Caucasus represents both a challenge and an opportunity for New Delhi to prove its role as a global player capable of shaping the region’s future amid energy disruptions and shifting alliances.

Military analyst,
Nino Samadashvili

#ANALYSIS

#INDIA

30.10.2025 02:50