The invitation extended to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to join the Gaza Peace Council being formed with U.S. participation has become an important indicator of a shifting balance of power in the Middle East. This is not a symbolic gesture, but a de facto recognition that without Turkey it is impossible to build a sustainable political framework for Gaza’s postwar future. Washington, despite its decisive influence, faces a serious deficit of trust among Arab and Muslim public opinion, while Ankara has retained a reputation as one of the few states capable of speaking to the Palestinians in the language of political and moral legitimacy. In this sense, Turkey serves for the United States as a convenient intermediary and a kind of buffer, able to soften perceptions of American involvement in the settlement process.

For Ankara itself, participation in such a format opens far broader opportunities. Turkey gains direct access to the process of shaping Gaza’s political architecture and, more broadly, to discussions on regional security, where its voice now sounds on a par with traditional centers of power. Erdogan consistently uses the Palestinian issue as a tool to restore Turkey’s status as an indispensable regional actor – one capable of maintaining dialogue with the West while simultaneously consolidating the Islamic world around itself.

Against this backdrop, Turkey’s negotiations on joining a regional defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan appear as a logical continuation of the same strategy. This format of cooperation goes far beyond conventional security agreements. Pakistan possesses nuclear capabilities and significant military experience; Saudi Arabia commands vast financial resources and energy influence; and Turkey in recent years has emerged as one of the key producers and exporters of modern weapons, particularly unmanned systems and precision strike capabilities. Taken together, this forms an alternative center of power in the Islamic world that is not fully dependent on either the United States or other external actors. For Ankara, this means greater strategic autonomy, a strengthening of its domestic defense industry, and expanded capacity to project power from the Eastern Mediterranean to South Asia.

It is precisely in this context that Israel’s concern over the prospect of Turkey and Qatar participating in the governance of Gaza becomes clear. Tel Aviv’s apprehension is linked less to a direct confrontation with Ankara than to the risk of losing its monopoly over determining the enclave’s future. Acting through humanitarian, political, and religious channels, Turkey and Qatar are capable of entrenching themselves in Gaza as long-term external guarantors of the Palestinian side. For Israel, this would signify a shift from a familiar model based on military dominance to one of multilateral governance, in which its influence would be constrained and constantly balanced by other regional players. An additional source of anxiety is the possibility that, under such circumstances, Hamas structures – even in a transformed form – could retain their social and political base.

Ultimately, a picture emerges of a complex and multilayered game in which Erdogan acts with maximum pragmatism. With the United States, he builds a functional dialogue, offering Turkey’s services as a mediator and stabilizer. In relations with the Islamic world, he reinforces the image of a political and moral leader capable of defending the Palestinian agenda. With Israel, Ankara avoids a direct rupture, preferring a strategy of firm containment and pressure through international and regional mechanisms. Thus, the Palestinian issue is transformed for Turkey not only into a humanitarian or ideological cause, but into a powerful instrument for expanding influence and securing a role as one of the principal architects of Middle Eastern security.

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19.01.2026 01:24