Georgia is demonstrating an increasingly noticeable shift in its foreign policy rhetoric. The government of Irakli Kobakhidze is avoiding directly referring to Russia as an “enemy”, while simultaneously expanding pragmatic contacts with Moscow, developing economic relations with Belarus, and deepening cooperation with China. Against this backdrop, protests by supporters of European integration continue inside the country, while the 2008 August war has once again become one of the main tools of domestic political struggle.

Kobakhidze: Calling Russia an Enemy Means Taking a Political Step

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze stated that he does not consider it appropriate to use the phrase “Russia is an enemy”. According to him, such a definition is not a neutral statement and implies subsequent political actions.

This position is indicative of the current course of the Georgian government. Tbilisi continues to speak of the country’s territorial integrity and maintains its principled opposition to the Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while at the same time seeking to avoid a new direct confrontation with Moscow.

Thus, the Georgian authorities are effectively distinguishing between the territorial conflict with Russia and the need to maintain working relations with the Russian state.

This is particularly important for the Georgian Dream party from an economic perspective. Russia remains one of Georgia’s significant trading and tourism partners, and since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Georgian authorities have repeatedly emphasized that they do not intend to impose bilateral sanctions on Moscow.

Moscow Offers Tbilisi “Pragmatic” Cooperation

Against the backdrop of the cautious rhetoric of the Georgian government, Moscow is also demonstrating an interest in further rapprochement. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin stated that Moscow is ready to develop and expand pragmatic relations with Tbilisi. The Russian side views economic contacts and political dialogue as the foundation for further improvement in bilateral relations.

In practice, Moscow is offering Georgia a model of relations based not on resolving the political issue surrounding Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but on the gradual expansion of practical cooperation. This corresponds to Russia’s diplomatic approach in recent years: rather than demanding that Tbilisi immediately change its position on territorial issues, Moscow seeks to build a network of economic and humanitarian ties capable of gradually strengthening mutual interdependence between the two countries.

This approach is also convenient for Tbilisi. It allows Georgia to gain economic benefits from relations with Russia without recognizing the Russian position on the occupied territories.

Belarus Becomes Another Direction of the Eastern Economic Vector

At the same time, Georgia is expanding its economic contacts with Belarus. Tbilisi and Minsk are discussing increased trade and supplies of Georgian products to the Belarusian market.

The growth in trade between the two countries during the first half of 2026 indicates that the Georgian authorities continue to use economic diplomacy as a tool for diversifying their external relations.

However, there is a broader political context. Belarus is one of Russia’s closest allies, and the expansion of economic cooperation between Tbilisi and Minsk objectively fits into the development of a broader network of relations between Georgia and post-Soviet states.

At the same time, Tbilisi is seeking to avoid turning these ties into a formal political alliance. The focus is primarily on trade, transportation, investment, and humanitarian contacts.

The 2008 War Becomes a Tool of Domestic Politics

The year 2008 occupies a special place in the current political debate. Against the backdrop of the 18th anniversary of the Russian-Georgian war, the Georgian Dream government has once again intensified its criticism of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and his team.

Kobakhidze stated that the war was launched by the Georgian leadership “at the direction of foreign powers”. For the current authorities, this is not merely a historical assessment. The issue of August 2008 is being used as an argument in favor of Tbilisi’s current policy: the government seeks to portray itself as the political force that will prevent a repeat of military escalation with Russia.

In this logic, Saakashvili has become a symbol of the opposite model — a policy of tough confrontation with Moscow and close military-political alignment with the West.

Opponents of Georgian Dream, by contrast, view this interpretation as an attempt to shift responsibility away from Russia and use the tragedy of 2008 to justify the government’s current retreat from the Euro-Atlantic course.

Protests Show That the Domestic Conflict Has Not Disappeared

At the same time, domestic confrontation continues. In Tbilisi, supporters of European integration continue to take to the streets to protest against government policies. The protest movement has become one of the longest-running political crises in modern Georgian history.

For the opposition, the government’s rejection of harsh anti-Russian rhetoric is evidence of a gradual shift in the country’s geopolitical course. The authorities, in turn, argue that a confrontational policy could endanger Georgia’s security and lead to a repetition of the 2008 scenario.

Thus, the dispute between the government and the opposition is gradually moving beyond an ordinary struggle for power. The central question is what model of Georgian statehood the country should pursue — a state maximally integrated into Western structures, or a country that simultaneously cooperates with the West, Russia, China, and other centers of power.

Georgia Is Attempting to Pursue a Multi-Vector Policy

Recent developments suggest that Tbilisi is not necessarily moving toward a formal abandonment of its European direction. Rather, the government appears to be attempting to change the balance of its external relations.

The Georgian government is seeking simultaneously to:

• maintain economic relations with Russia;
• expand trade with Belarus;
• deepen strategic and economic ties with China;
• avoid direct military confrontation with Moscow;
• maintain relations with the EU and other Western partners;
• use the country’s geographic position to develop transit projects.

In this sense, the Georgian Dream government’s policy increasingly resembles a multi-vector model in which economic interests are separated from political orientation. The key question is how long Tbilisi will be able to maintain this balance.

The Main Risk for Tbilisi Is Not Russia, but Domestic Polarization

At the same time, the most serious threat to the government’s current course may not come from Moscow. Georgian society remains deeply divided over the country’s foreign-policy orientation. For a significant part of the population, European integration has become not merely a foreign-policy objective, but part of the country’s national identity and vision of its future. Therefore, any noticeable rapprochement with Russia is automatically perceived by the opposition as a move toward Russia’s sphere of influence.

The government, however, seeks to frame the situation differently: not as a turn toward the East, but as a rejection of a policy that could drag Georgia into another war. It is precisely this confrontation between two strategies — “European integration at any cost” versus “security and pragmatic relations with all centers of power” — that is likely to shape Georgia’s political agenda in the near future.

As a result, Georgia finds itself facing a difficult choice. Tbilisi is seeking to maintain access to Western markets and institutions without severing its economic ties with Russia, while expanding cooperation with China and other non-Western partners.

This is no longer simply a change in rhetoric. It is the gradual formation of a new foreign-policy model for Georgia — a model in which Tbilisi seeks not to choose a single geopolitical camp, but to derive economic and strategic advantages from the competition between them.

 

CCBS Expert Group

#GEORGIA

#ANALYSIS

#RUSSIA

#BELARUS

11.08.2026 11:07