President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has introduced amendments to the existing Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020–2030. The decision comes amid a significant transformation of the international system, intensifying competition among major powers, and growing geopolitical risks for Central Asian states.

The revision of the foreign policy document is particularly significant for Kazakhstan, which maintains close ties with Russia, deepens cooperation with China, expands relations with the European Union, the United States and Turkiye, and seeks to strengthen its own role in Central Asia.

The current concept was approved by a presidential decree signed by Tokayev on March 6, 2020. It defines Kazakhstan as a state pursuing an independent, pragmatic and multi-vector foreign policy based on protecting national interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Its fundamental principles also include non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, the peaceful settlement of conflicts, multilateralism and a balance of interests.

Why has Astana decided to revise the document?

The revision of the concept comes against a fundamentally different international backdrop from the one that existed when the document was adopted six years ago.

Following the outbreak of the full-scale Russia-Ukraine war, Kazakhstan found itself in a complex geopolitical position. On the one hand, Russia remains one of Astana’s most important economic and military-political partners, while Kazakhstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

On the other hand, Astana has consistently emphasized its sovereignty and the need to diversify its foreign relations. Kazakhstan has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, but at the same time it has refused to recognize the annexation of Ukrainian territories and continues to develop relations with the EU, the United States, China, Turkiye and other centers of power.

Tokayev himself has repeatedly emphasized in recent months the need for a maximally balanced foreign policy focused primarily on protecting Kazakhstan’s national sovereignty and strategic interests. In one of his recent public statements, he said that foreign policy should focus on protecting and promoting the country’s strategic interests, while Kazakhstan’s independence remains a fundamental principle of its national strategy.

China and Europe are becoming increasingly important directions

The revision of the concept comes amid a noticeable expansion of Kazakhstan’s engagement with China and the EU.

In June, Tokayev visited Brussels, where he held talks with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The Kazakh side said that relations with the EU were at their highest level in the history of bilateral cooperation.

At the same time, Astana is actively developing its Chinese direction. Kazakhstan views China not only as its largest trading partner, but also as a source of investment, technology and infrastructure development.

The transport dimension is becoming particularly important. Kazakhstan seeks to turn its geographical position between China, Russia, the Caspian Sea and Europe into an economic advantage by developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route and other Eurasian corridors.

Thus, for Astana, multi-vectorism is gradually acquiring not only a diplomatic but also an economic dimension: Kazakhstan is seeking to avoid critical dependence on a single market, a single transport route or a single external partner.

Russia remains a key, but no longer the only, center

At the same time, it would be premature to speak of a Kazakh geopolitical shift away from Russia.

The economic and infrastructural interdependence between the two countries remains high. Kazakhstan continues to participate in the EAEU and CSTO, while the Russian direction remains highly important for trade, energy, logistics and security.

However, changes in the international environment are prompting Astana to reduce the potential risks associated with excessive dependence.

Kazakhstan is effectively pursuing a strategy of “not choosing a side, but preserving room for maneuver”.

This is particularly important given the country’s geography: Kazakhstan shares a long border with Russia, is located next to China, and at the same time has access to the Caspian Sea, through which it can develop connections with Azerbaijan, Turkiye and Europe.

A new factor: strengthening Central Asia

Another important element of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is the strengthening of regional cooperation.

Kazakhstan is increasingly positioning itself not simply as a participant in relations with individual global powers, but as one of the centers of an emerging Central Asian diplomatic framework.

Astana is interested in ensuring that issues related to security, transport, energy and water resources are increasingly addressed jointly by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

At the same time, Kazakhstan is promoting the Turkic dimension of its foreign policy. Astana is one of the founding members of the Organization of Turkic States and advocates deeper political and economic cooperation within the organization. Kazakhstan is also promoting the concept of the “Turkic World – 2040” and the “Trans-Altaic Dialogue” initiative.

What does Tokayev’s decision mean?

The main significance of the revision of the concept lies not in abandoning multi-vectorism, but in adapting it to the new international reality.

In 2020, Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy was primarily a tool for maintaining a balance between Russia, China and the West. In 2026, the task has become more complicated: the international system is increasingly characterized by competition among several centers of power, while the space for neutral diplomacy is narrowing.

Astana is therefore seeking to transform multi-vectorism into a mechanism of strategic autonomy.

Kazakhstan is pursuing several objectives simultaneously:

1. maintaining working relations with Russia without becoming excessively dependent on Moscow;
2. expanding economic and technological cooperation with China;
3. using the EU as a source of investment, technology and alternative transport routes;
4. strengthening relations with Turkiye and other Turkic states;
5. developing cooperation with the United States and the Gulf countries;
6. strengthening its own role in Central Asia;
7. diversifying export and transit routes.

The last point is particularly important. Kazakhstan’s economy remains closely linked to commodity exports, while a significant part of its traditional infrastructure has historically been oriented toward Russian territory. Therefore, the development of alternative routes across the Caspian Sea is acquiring not only economic but also strategic significance for Astana.

Kazakhstan’s National Development Plan through 2029 explicitly points to the need to diversify the economy and identifies limitations associated with the country’s commodity-based export model. At the same time, the document emphasizes the need to expand Kazakhstan’s participation in global trade and develop modern infrastructure.

 

The revision of the foreign policy concept should be viewed as part of a broader transformation of Kazakhstan. In 2026, the country is simultaneously undergoing significant domestic political and constitutional changes. A new Constitution was adopted in a referendum on March 15, 2026, while a new stage of state-building began on June 30. Therefore, the updating of the foreign policy concept fits logically into the broader process of shaping a new model for Kazakhstan.

Astana is seeking to build a state that remains sufficiently close to all major centers of power, but not so close to any one of them that it loses its independence. This is the essence of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy today. However, the strategy has a serious limitation: Kazakhstan cannot completely distance itself from either Russia or China. Its economic geography and security interests make this practically impossible. Therefore, the most realistic scenario is not a geopolitical “pivot”, but a gradual expansion of the number of Kazakhstan’s external pillars.

Thus, Tokayev’s update of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy concept should be viewed not as an abandonment of the country’s previous course, but as its adaptation to a world in which balancing among competing centers of power is becoming increasingly difficult. Astana is seeking to move from traditional multi-vectorism toward a more active policy of strategic autonomy, in which the main objective is not membership in a particular bloc, but maximizing the space available for independent decision-making.

CCBS Research Desk 

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19.08.2026 06:01