It is not an easy task to follow closely the events surrounding the Russo-Ukrainian war on a daily basis and then to write a monthly overview, because there are always inner voices and questions. What is significant and what is not? Is a given action just a random act, or is it a part of a long-term strategy? Which is true and which is just propaganda? How do we select the most important events among the enormous pile of news that overwhelm us around the clock? Believe me, it is a tough job. Nevertheless, in my current analysis I’ll try to review the most important events and the tendencies they produce, although I’ll avoid ranking them in any particular order of importance.

The situation on the front line remains stable; that is to say, there are no significant shifts in either direction, despite the continuing Russian onslaught. A few days ago the General Staff of the AFU (Ukrainian Armed Forces) announced a great success — the liberation of 26 small settlements and several hundred sq. kilometers of Ukrainian territory in the vast area between Pokrovsk and Huliaipole — but one has to keep in mind that this hasn’t happened overnight but is a summary of an ongoing operation that started already in February. It also reflects a very important fact — the Russian army is already critically short of reserves and is not capable of taking urgent measures in the form of local counterattacks to prevent the Ukrainian inroad. The Ukrainians are also very active in the critically important sector to the south of Zaporizhzhia, where they slowly but steadily push the invaders back to the south, towards the Azov Sea. This allows the AFU to further squeeze the land corridor linking mainland Russia and Crimea and thus deepen the supply crisis in the peninsula.

In most of the other sectors the initiative belongs to the Russians. They are active in the border area east of Sumy, in the northernmost part of the Kharkiv Oblast (where they try to outflank the ruins of Vovchansk from the east), as well as in the vicinity of Kupiansk, where they simultaneously attempt to smash the Ukrainian bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Oskil and to infiltrate back into the town they lost earlier this year.  

The focal point of the Russian offensive is still in Donbas. The main focus of Putin’s army is Kostiantynivka, which the Kremlin propaganda has already declared as fully "liberated". The truth, however, is quite different — only the southern and eastern districts of the city are firmly in Russian hands, while the rest is the so-called “grey zone", i.e., an area where active combat is taking place. Small infantry groups of both opponents are literally intermixed, occupying all buildings that are still standing. Exact positions are almost impossible to pinpoint, and the more precise situation maps resemble a plate of lasagna or a spaghetti bowl. My prediction is that the Ukrainian high command will do their best to hold the "fortress" of Kostiantynivka as long as possible due to three reasons: politics, propaganda, and strategy. The politics and propaganda usually work well together, and in this particular case they will try to convince the audience both at home and abroad that Ukraine is still capable of withstanding even the fiercest push of the invaders. The strategy is usually in the background, since it is not always easy to explain, but here it is apparent: the fall of Kostiantynivka would allow the Russians to approach the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the south and speed up the occupation of the rest of Donbas.

The battle for Donbas will not be decided in Kostiantynivka alone. The Russians are already dangerously close to the eastern suburbs of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk (estimated at no more than 15 km), and the situation calls for urgent intervention on the part of the new commander-in-chief of the AFU, General Drapatyi. He has already taken the first step by appointing the 39-year-old Colonel Emil Ishkolov, a very experienced and independently thinking officer, the commander of the 11th Corps, which is in charge of the defense of the twin cities. Perhaps Drapatyi will be forced to take another important decision pretty soon — to stop the offensive in the south in order to reinforce the endangered Sloviansk-Kramatorsk sector. As it was already mentioned, the offensive in question produces a great deal of propaganda value, but the pace of its advance is extremely slow, and it will take months before the next sizable portion of territorial gains will be announced. On the other hand, the war waits for no one, and the urgent need of well-trained and experienced troops, like the ones currently operating in the south, may lead to the cancelation of the promising Ukrainian counteroffensive.

There is no pause in the long-range strike campaigns carried out by both belligerents. The Russians have already succeeded in shutting down the port of Odessa, which serves as the main export hub for the Ukrainian grain and other agricultural produce. This forced Kyiv to redirect the cargo ships to the Danube ports Reni and Izmail, as well as through the main Rumanian port, Constanța. The forced move, however, will help exporting only 30 to 50% of the usual annual amount, which definitely will result in great financial losses for the Ukrainian farmers and the state budget.

The AFU responded by delivering a retaliatory strike on the main Russian Black Sea port, Novorossiysk, on the night of 11/12 August. It could safely be called a modern repetition of the famous Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor back in 1941 because of the long-term devastating effect it will have on Russia. A considerable number of flying munitions were used, including “Palianytsia” jet-engine drones and “Neptune” missiles, as well as sea drones. The result was threefold: the main grain terminal was badly damaged, the oil export terminal was ruined, and several combat vessels moored in the protected naval base were shattered. The latter included two missile-carrying frigates, “Admiral Makarov” and “Admiral Essen"; the patrol ship “Vasily Bykov"; the reconnaissance ship "Priazovye"; and several auxiliary vessels. It is important to note the precision of the Ukrainian strike — the damage the frigates have sustained (the launching platforms for “Kaliber” cruise missiles were disabled) will prevent them from attacking the Ukrainian cities in the near future. The grain and oil terminals are out of operation, too — maybe not for very long, but nevertheless, this will cost the Russian budget billions of rubles. This was the fourth attack on the oil terminal, and after each of them the emergency service teams managed to put it back in operation after 3-4 days. No one can tell how long it will take the Russians to restore the functioning of the grain export terminal, but even if it resumes its operations soon, one has to keep in mind that the situation in the agricultural sector in the RF is quite bad. In particular, estimates show that grain production will be the smallest in 12 years due to a combination of bad weather conditions, high fuel prices, and the bad economy as a whole. The price of bread that Russian families consume every day will also rise.

While such 3-in-1 combined strikes like the one on Novorossiysk are rather occasional and sporadic in character, four more Ukrainian “deep-strike” campaigns continue unabated: Wildberries, the oil refineries, the military-industrial complex, and the Crimea blockade. The methodical annihilation of Wildberries, Russia's biggest online retailer, is no longer headline news; it is a daily routine. The first strikes were delivered in the early hours of 18 July, and since then nearly all the company's largest warehouses (close to 30% of the total storage capacity) were obliterated. The estimated gross damage inflicted on Wildberries and the small retailers that use its services is more than 10 billion USD. Given the fact that the GMV (Gross Merchandise Value) of the company in the Russian economy is about 3%, its downfall could be compared to a constantly bleeding wound that could not be healed. The share of Wildberries in the domestic online sales is nearly 45%; the second place belongs to Ozon (32%), and it is not difficult to conclude that the latter company will be among the top priorities of the AFU once Wildberries is finished off.  

The other “deep-strike” campaigns also provide some food for thought. Since mid-July, up to 12 oil refineries were hit by Ukrainian drones; four of them still haven’t resumed processing operations. Currently there is a severe fuel shortage in at least ten Russian regions and perhaps not so severe in several others. The side effect of the burning oil refiners is the crash of the RGBI (the Russian Government Bond Index), which on 17 August nose-dived, losing about 1% of its previous value. Experts explained this downward slide with heavy inflation pressure and investors' "skepticism and negativism".

Speaking of the AFU attacks on the Russian military-industrial complex, we must outline one major change in their outcome: now they are far more destructive than ever before. The reason is simple: the Ukrainians are gradually switching from drones to more devastating weapons like the Flamingo FP-5 cruise missiles. The difference between them is quite significant — while a drone usually carries between 100 and 200 kg of explosives, the payload of a Flamingo is about 1,150 kg, let alone that there is a considerable improvement in its accuracy. This explains why the latter is becoming the weapon of choice for those who plan the long-range campaigns in Kiev. Eight (out of 20) military factories were hit by Flamingos during the last 30 days, and high-res satellite images clearly show that they have sustained grave damages.

The blockade of Crimea pursues a completely different objective — a total long-term paralysis of the military capabilities of the peninsula as a base, coupled with hindering the civilian life there due to political, propaganda, and psychological reasons. That’s why its current effect couldn’t be measured, but given the ongoing exodus through the Kerch Bridge, it definitely works.

Military Expert

Kamen NEVENKIN

#ANALYSIS

#RUSSIA

#UKRAINE

21.08.2026 02:17