Tehran has proposed a concrete seven-day plan to Washington that envisages a cessation of hostilities on the main fronts of the Middle Eastern conflict, followed by the restoration of free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The initiative was conveyed to the US side through intermediaries, including Qatar, amid diplomatic contacts between Iran and the United States in New York. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that once the agreed conditions are fulfilled, shipping through the strategic strait could be restored within seven days. According to him, the decision on further steps now rests with Washington.

 

Tehran's proposal envisages a phased framework in which the issue of Hormuz becomes the first element of a broader deal. According to details that have been made public, Iran is linking the reopening of the strait to a cessation of hostilities on regional fronts, including Lebanon, the lifting of the US naval blockade, and a reduction in economic pressure. The conditions under discussion also reportedly include the lifting of restrictions on Iranian oil exports and the unfreezing of some Iranian assets. Under the proposed Iranian framework, normal shipping through the strait would be restored on the seventh day after these conditions are met, after which the sides could move on to more complex issues, including Iran's nuclear program.

Iran is effectively proposing that the parties should not address all disputed issues simultaneously, but instead divide the crisis into several stages: a cessation of hostilities, the removal of economic and maritime pressure, the restoration of shipping, and only then negotiations on the nuclear issue. This model resembles arrangements reached by the parties earlier in June, although the current proposal envisages a significantly shorter seven-day timetable. The previous arrangement subsequently collapsed amid renewed tensions over the regime governing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

At the same time, Tehran is making clear that the nuclear issue is not being treated as an area for immediate compromise. A senior Iranian official told Reuters that even if Washington accepts the proposal concerning Hormuz, Iran does not intend to make concessions regarding its nuclear capabilities. In particular, Tehran maintains its position on the right to enrich uranium and is not prepared to automatically agree to the removal of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium from the country. Thus, the proposal to reopen Hormuz does not indicate Iran's readiness to accept US demands on the nuclear issue.

This is where one of the main contradictions between the positions of the two sides lies. Iran is seeking first to secure an end to the pressure and restore its economic capabilities, and only then to discuss the nuclear program. Washington, by contrast, links an end to the conflict to a broader settlement centered on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore, even a potential agreement on Hormuz would not by itself resolve the core strategic dispute between the two countries.

Another factor is the domestic political agenda in the United States. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said that Tehran would like to revive an agreement with Washington before the US midterm elections on November 3. Donald Trump, meanwhile, has previously said that he expects a deal to be reached only after the elections. The two sides have therefore publicly outlined different timelines for a possible diplomatic settlement.

It should be noted that the Strait of Hormuz is becoming not only a military and energy factor, but also a diplomatic instrument. The strait carries one of the world's most important flows of oil and gas, meaning that restrictions on shipping directly affect energy markets and transportation costs. In recent days, hopes for renewed negotiations between Washington and Tehran have already been accompanied by a decline in oil prices, illustrating the market's sensitivity to the prospect of restoring normal traffic through the strait.

However, using Hormuz as a negotiating instrument also creates additional risks for Tehran. The longer restrictions remain in place, the greater the economic pressure on the states of the Persian Gulf and the greater the likelihood of a coalition of regional and external actors seeking to secure alternative routes and maritime security.

This dynamic is already becoming apparent in Iran's relations with Arab states. Against the backdrop of attacks by Iran-backed Houthis on Saudi territory, Riyadh is intensifying contacts with other regional states and external partners. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Egypt and Pakistan have issued a joint statement affirming Riyadh's right to self-defense and stressing the need to ensure the security of maritime communications. At the same time, London has agreed with Saudi Arabia to provide defense support, including air-to-air refueling capabilities.

Against this background, Iran's diplomatic activity in New York takes on particular significance. The talks between Abbas Araghchi and US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, mediated by Qatar, indicate that a complete diplomatic rupture between Washington and Tehran has not occurred despite the continuing confrontation. At the same time, the US side has not yet demonstrated a willingness to accept Iran's proposed sequencing of steps as the basis for an agreement. Iran is awaiting Washington's official position, while reports that Trump has already rejected Tehran's proposal are so far based on a publication by the Wall Street Journal and have not been confirmed by an official US response.

 

Thus, Tehran's current diplomatic initiative represents an attempt to convert the leverage it derives from its ability to influence traffic through Hormuz into negotiating capital. The prospects for an agreement will therefore depend not only on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, but also on whether the two sides can agree on the sequence for addressing interconnected issues: the cessation of hostilities, the shipping regime, the US blockade, oil sanctions, frozen Iranian assets, and the nuclear program. At present, the difference over this sequencing remains one of the main obstacles to turning diplomatic contacts into a sustainable agreement.

CCBS Research Desk

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26.09.2026 07:23