The South Caucasus has once again found itself at the center of international attention — not because of high-profile treaty signings or large-scale military deployments, but due to a far subtler and more revealing factor: even unconfirmed military intentions today are capable of radically reshaping states’ strategic calculations. This logic, whereby expectations of future arms deliveries begin to influence behavior long before their actual implementation, has long been characteristic of other regions — from Eastern Europe to the Middle East — but in the South Caucasus it takes on a particularly concentrated form.

Throughout the summer, autumn, and even the early winter of 2025, reports circulated actively about a possible Armenian purchase of Indian Su-30MKI fighter jets. The first rumors emerged as early as June, and by October–November, according to various sources, discussions involved 8–12 aircraft with a total value of up to USD 3 billion. However, on 3 November 2025, Armenia’s Minister of Defense Suren Papikyan publicly and unequivocally denied the existence of any such agreements, stating that “no such deals exist”. This denial was promptly echoed by both Armenian and Azerbaijani media and soon confirmed by statements from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited.

Su-30MKI is a multirole heavy fighter of the 4++ generation, developed by Russia’s Sukhoi Design Bureau specifically for the Indian Air Force

Almost simultaneously, in early November, during preparations in Baku for a military parade marking the fifth anniversary of victory in the Second Karabakh War, video footage of Chinese HQ-9BE air defense systems appeared in the public domain. On 8 November, these systems were officially displayed at the parade on Azadlyg Square. Taken together, these two parallel developments — the denial of Armenia’s aviation plans and the visible demonstration of Azerbaijan’s new capabilities — produced a tangible effect: the regional balance began to shift primarily at the level of perception, even without the actual emergence of new aviation platforms in Armenia.

The HQ-9BE is a Chinese long-range surface-to-air missile system — the latest export variant of China’s HQ-9 family

Under such conditions, it is not the delivery itself that becomes decisive, but the expectation of change. The South Caucasus has long operated within a logic of preemptive reactions, where signals, interpretations, and demonstrations of force often prove more influential than material reality.

Armenia’s official position, articulated on 3 November 2025 and reaffirmed in the following days, remains unequivocal: no contracts for the acquisition of Su-30MKI aircraft exist. This fully corresponds both to SIPRI data for 2024–2025, which show no records of major aviation deliveries to Armenia, and to the absence of the infrastructural or budgetary indicators that typically accompany such deals.

At the same time, Armenia is deliberately leaving room for maneuver. Formally, the purchase has not been definitively rejected, yet neither has it been confirmed. This caution may be explained by several factors.

First, the 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan highlighted serious challenges for Indian aviation. In confrontations with Pakistani JF-17 Block-3 fighters equipped with Chinese systems, Indian Su-30MKIs and Rafales faced intense competition in electronic warfare and weapons effectiveness. The outcome of this confrontation, given the lack of comprehensive official data from India, may have prompted Yerevan to reassess the associated risks.

JF-17 Block-3 is a multirole light fighter of the 4++ generation, jointly developed by Pakistan and China

Second, the financial dimension remains critical. The full packages of Rafale and Su-30 aircraft differ dramatically in cost, and the Indian-built Su-30MKI objectively appears to be a more affordable option, especially given that the Armenian Air Force already operates Russian-made Su-30SM fighters. Despite differences in avionics and weapon systems, the Indian version is logistically compatible with previously acquired platforms and, crucially, does not tie Armenia to Russian supply chains — a matter of fundamental importance under current conditions.

An additional factor is the broader deepening of Armenian-Indian military-technical cooperation in 2023–2025, including deliveries of Pinaka multiple-launch rocket systems, ATAGS artillery, radars, communications equipment, and air defense systems. These steps created a stable logistical and political foundation against which rumors of combat aircraft appeared a logical continuation, even if they ultimately remained at the level of speculation.

Pinaka is a long-range multiple launch rocket system developed by India

The hypothetical appearance of heavy multirole fighters in Armenia could have significantly altered operational calculations by expanding airspace control and raising the cost of any force-based scenario for an adversary. However, without deep integration with ground-based air defense and a modern command-and-control system, such aviation risked remaining more of a political symbol than a decisive military instrument.

Against this backdrop, Baku’s actions look fundamentally different. Azerbaijan did not confine itself to signals or leaks but publicly unveiled Chinese long-range HQ-9BE air defense systems for the first time, becoming one of the few known operators of this complex. Their appearance was not merely a technical update, but a powerful strategic statement.

Azerbaijan had already possessed a fairly modern and layered air defense system, ranging from Soviet-era complexes to Israeli Barak systems and modernized Buk and S-300 variants. However, the key task for Baku became the diversification of arms suppliers. Against the backdrop of shortages of Russian missiles and the heavy burden on Russia’s defense industry due to the war in Ukraine, the Chinese option emerged as a rational and timely solution.

Barak systems are a family of Israeli air and missile defense systems developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems

Despite the limitations of HQ-9BE effectiveness against certain threats revealed during conflicts, for Azerbaijan this represents a serious step forward — both militarily and politically. It symbolizes the expansion of the Asian vector, readiness to integrate into new military-technological chains, and the ability to respond to any potential shifts in the balance of power in a preemptive and demonstrative manner. An earlier signal of the same kind was the induction of JF-17 Block III fighter jets into service.

In the absence of official confirmations, analysis inevitably relies on indirect indicators: diplomatic activity, changes in infrastructure, and budgetary signals. For the South Caucasus, this has long been the norm. The growth of Armenian-Indian contacts in 2024–2025 created fertile ground for rumors, but in itself did not imply the inevitability of an aviation deal.

Even without contracts, several scenarios can be identified. The first is symbolic deterrence, where deepening partnerships serve as a political signal without immediate materialization. The second is Azerbaijan’s preemptive response in the form of real acquisitions and demonstrations, which was precisely what occurred in the autumn of 2025. The third is delayed implementation, whereby today’s speculation may return to the agenda in several years under altered financial or geopolitical conditions.

The Caucasus remains an extremely compact region where any activity quickly becomes visible. Armenia has already strengthened its defensive potential through Indian supplies, yet it neither possesses nor seeks the capacity for external expansion. In the long run, the outcome of potential conflicts is determined by demographics and resources rather than by the sheer quantity of weapons.

The story of aircraft that officially do not exist, combined with the simultaneous demonstration of real Chinese air defense systems, vividly illustrates a key feature of contemporary regional politics: the balance of power is shaped not only by contracts and platforms, but also by expectations, rumors, leaks, and public gestures.

The South Caucasus is entering a phase in which a short video from a parade rehearsal or a ministerial statement can trigger a chain of strategic reactions. As traditional centers of influence weaken and the roles of India and China grow, the management of perception becomes a tool comparable in importance to the management of troops.

Azerbaijan’s growing ambitions, reinforced by its alliance with Turkey, add further complexity to the region’s security architecture and affect the position of neighboring states, including Georgia. In the long term, resources and demographics remain decisive, but in the short term it is precisely signals and demonstrations that can heighten tensions or open space for diplomatic maneuvering.

Ultimately, external actors — India and China — influence the region not only through arms supplies, but also through the redistribution of political weight. Managing expectations and perceptions becomes no less powerful an instrument than the military systems themselves, and it is within this intangible dimension that the future security architecture of the South Caucasus is taking shape today.

Military analyst,
Nino Samadashvili

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02.01.2026 07:55