Georgia’s Defence Capabilities in a Changing Black Sea Security Environment: Strategic Intelligence, Deterrence and Defence Modernisation

    Abstract

    The transformation of the Black Sea security environment has presented Georgia’s defence policy with increasingly complex challenges. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the expanding use of unmanned aerial and maritime systems, advances in long-range precision-strike capabilities, and hybrid operations targeting critical infrastructure have altered the character of contemporary military confrontation and traditional perceptions of regional security. Under these circumstances, Georgia’s defence resilience can no longer be assessed solely in terms of military resources or the possession of individual weapons systems. Its effectiveness increasingly depends on the state’s ability to identify emerging threats, assess their potential trajectories, determine national vulnerabilities, and translate available resources into coordinated defence capabilities.This article examines the principal strategic, institutional, and military challenges facing Georgia’s defence system amid changes in the Black Sea security environment and identifies priority areas for defence modernisation. The research draws on the analysis of strategic documents, institutional assessment, capability gap analysis, comparative analysis, and scenario-based assessment. Particular attention is given to the role of strategic intelligence and early warning in defence planning and decision-making.

    The article introduces the author-developed Integrated Defence and Strategic Resilience Framework for Georgia (IDSR-G), which brings together five interconnected dimensions: strategic intelligence and early warning; military capabilities; institutional resilience; deterrence and national resilience; and strategic partnerships. The central argument is that Georgia’s defence effectiveness depends not merely on acquiring military resources, but on the institutional capacity to connect threat assessment with capability development, operational readiness, and national resilience.

    Introduction

    The Black Sea region has become one of the strategically significant geopolitical spaces in contemporary international security. Its importance derives not only from the geographical position of its coastal states but also from the transportation, energy, and trade routes connecting Europe and Eurasia, intensifying military and political competition, and shifts in the regional balance of power. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 further exacerbated existing tensions, demonstrating the close relationship between military deployments, the security of maritime communications, the protection of energy infrastructure, and regional deterrence.The war in Ukraine has exposed several defining characteristics of contemporary military confrontation. These include the extensive use of unmanned aerial and maritime systems, the growing importance of intelligence and real-time data, the integration of electronic warfare and cyber operations, advances in precision-strike capabilities, and attacks targeting both military and civilian critical infrastructure. These developments demonstrate that military effectiveness is increasingly determined by factors beyond the quantity of conventional weapons. Interoperability, the speed of information collection and processing, the quality of decision-making, force survivability, and operational adaptability have become equally important.

    These changes carry particular strategic significance for Georgia. Located at the intersection of the Black Sea and the South Caucasus, the country forms part of the transit space connecting Europe and Asia. The ports of Poti and Batumi, energy and transportation corridors, and the development of regional connectivity enhance Georgia’s economic and geopolitical significance. However, geographical location does not automatically guarantee security. The growing importance of strategic infrastructure and transit functions instead requires stronger capabilities in maritime domain awareness, critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, crisis management, and interagency coordination.

    One of the principal determinants of Georgia’s security environment remains Russia’s military presence in occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. The occupation, the so-called borderisation process, illegal detentions, and security incidents near the occupation lines create sustained strategic pressure. The Council of Europe’s 2026 reporting referred to 21 incidents of so-called borderisation reported by the Georgian authorities during the reporting period. It also noted increased unmanned aerial vehicle activity observed by the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) beyond the administrative boundary lines, including activity associated with mission patrols. These developments indicate that the threats facing Georgia are not limited to the possibility of large-scale military escalation. They also include persistent pressure, challenges to incident management, and risks of destabilising the security environment.Georgia’s broader international security position must also inform any assessment of its defence policy. Cooperation with NATO provides opportunities to strengthen defence capabilities, interoperability, military education, institutional development, and national resilience. Practical cooperation, including through the Substantial NATO–Georgia Package (SNGP), remains an important element of this relationship. Nevertheless, Georgia is not a NATO member and therefore does not benefit from the Alliance’s collective defence guarantee. Partnership should consequently be understood as a resource for developing national capabilities rather than a substitute for the country’s own defence responsibilities.

    Against this background, the central research problem of this article is the extent to which Georgia’s defence planning, institutional arrangements, and military capabilities correspond to emerging threats in the Black Sea region, and which areas require transformation to ensure effective deterrence and national resilience.The article argues that Georgia’s defence challenge cannot be reduced to the limited availability of military resources or deficiencies in individual technological capabilities. A more fundamental issue concerns the state’s ability to transform threat-related information into strategic assessments, translate those assessments into defence priorities, and convert the resulting priorities into tangible military and institutional capabilities. Defence transformation should therefore be based on an integrated process linking intelligence, early warning, capability planning, institutional resilience, and international cooperation.The purpose of this research is to assess the strategic and institutional capabilities of Georgia’s defence system in the context of changes in the Black Sea security environment and to identify priority directions for defence modernisation.

    To achieve this objective, the research addresses the following tasks:

    • To analyse the transformation of the Black Sea security environment and the principal strategic threats facing Georgia;
    • To assess the main challenges affecting Georgia’s defence planning, institutional organisation, and military capability development;
    • To determine the significance of strategic intelligence and early warning in defence decision-making and resource allocation;
    • To examine contemporary trends in military deterrence and defence modernisation through the lessons of the war in Ukraine;
    • To identify priority areas for Georgia’s defence modernisation and develop an integrated analytical framework for defence and strategic resilience.

    The research is based on an analysis of publicly available strategic and legal documents, reports issued by international organisations, and academic literature. It employs strategic threat assessment, institutional analysis, Capability Gap Analysis, comparative analysis, and scenario-based assessment. The comparative dimension focuses primarily on lessons drawn from Ukraine’s wartime experience, while scenario-based assessment is used to examine their potential implications for Georgia’s defence planning. Ukraine is not treated as a model that can be directly replicated, but as an important source of insight into contemporary military operations, technological adaptation, and defence resilience.

    Changes in the Black Sea Security Environment and Georgia’s Strategic Vulnerabilities

    A defining characteristic of the contemporary Black Sea security environment is the growing interdependence of military, economic, and infrastructure-related interests. The regional balance of power is shaped not only by the military capabilities of coastal states but also by control over maritime communications, the protection of energy routes, military presence, international partnerships, and crisis-management capacity. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that the consequences of military confrontation in the Black Sea extend beyond the immediate area of hostilities, affecting commercial shipping, port operations, insurance risks, energy security, and the resilience of regional economic connections.Russia’s military operations against Ukraine and Ukraine’s use of asymmetric maritime capabilities have transformed traditional perceptions of naval warfare in the Black Sea. Unmanned maritime systems, remotely operated platforms, and coastal defence capabilities have demonstrated that an actor with comparatively limited resources can restrict an adversary’s freedom of maritime operations and inflict significant military or economic losses. Maritime security is therefore no longer confined to naval operations. It also encompasses the protection of ports, commercial vessels, maritime communications, coastal infrastructure, and maritime domain awareness.

    This development is particularly relevant to Georgia. The country’s Black Sea ports and associated land-based transportation networks constitute an important component of its economic and regional role. Their security must be assessed not only in terms of physical protection but also through the capacity to detect suspicious maritime activity, exchange information promptly, respond to incidents, and maintain the continuity of critical services.Georgia’s existing institutional mechanisms provide an important starting point for this assessment. On 5 March 2026, a meeting of the Interagency Maritime Security Council was held at the Joint Maritime Operations Centre, with representatives of the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and other relevant institutions participating. Discussions addressed the situation in the Black Sea, maritime security risks, and the priorities of the Centre. The meeting indicates the existence of a formal mechanism for interagency coordination. The central analytical question, however, is not simply whether such a structure exists, but how effectively it functions in practice. Relevant criteria include the speed of information exchange, the ability to establish a common operational picture, the effectiveness of response procedures, and interoperability among participating agencies.

    Georgia’s strategic vulnerabilities are also associated with Russia’s military and political position in the region. The Russian military presence in the occupied territories remains a permanent factor in Georgia’s defence planning. At the same time, developments along the occupation lines create an environment in which the risk of military escalation coexists with forms of low-intensity, intermittent, and difficult-to-predict pressure. Such circumstances require sustained situational awareness, intelligence assessment, crisis communication, and coordination with civilian institutions.It is important to distinguish between the concepts of threat and vulnerability. Geographical location, the presence of a port, or the operation of an energy corridor does not, in itself, make a particular facility vulnerable. Vulnerability emerges when the possibility of a specific threat intersects with the critical function of an asset and existing protection, redundancy, or recovery mechanisms prove insufficient. An assessment of Georgia’s strategic infrastructure should therefore examine the criticality of individual assets, potential sources of threats, existing protective measures, alternative routes, and recovery capabilities.

    Another important dimension of Black Sea security concerns risks to commercial maritime shipping. Incidents in the region have demonstrated the possibility of commercial vessels and maritime infrastructure being exposed to the consequences of armed conflict. Assessments must distinguish verified facts from assumptions regarding responsibility, since the actors or intentions behind every incident have not been publicly established. Nevertheless, the broader trend indicates that maritime security planning must account for disruptions to commercial shipping, navigational risks, temporary port restrictions, and interruptions to critical services.The regional environment is further complicated by the diversity of hybrid threats. Cyberattacks, disinformation, attempts to undermine public trust, covert activities targeting critical infrastructure, and the exploitation of political polarisation may serve as instruments of broader strategies of pressure. However, attributing a particular cyber incident or information campaign to a foreign state solely on the basis of political assumptions is methodologically unsound. Such attribution requires the combined assessment of technical, behavioural, and contextual evidence. Responses should therefore go beyond monitoring the dissemination of information and systematically examine its sources, objectives, distribution channels, target audiences, and anticipated effects.For Georgia, the security of the Black Sea and the South Caucasus must also be considered as part of an interconnected regional space. Transportation and energy links, Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, Türkiye’s regional role, Russian influence, and the interests of external actors create dynamics that extend across national boundaries. Georgia’s defence planning must consequently account not only for threats emerging directly along its borders but also for regional developments that may affect its transit function, economic security, international partnerships, and military-political environment.

    Georgia’s strategic vulnerability cannot therefore be determined merely by compiling a list of threats. It requires an assessment of how individual threats may develop, their potential impact on national interests, and the adequacy of existing protective and response capabilities. This provides the analytical basis for establishing priorities, identifying institutional requirements, and reducing risks through national measures and international cooperation.

    Georgia’s Defence Capabilities: Strategic Planning and Institutional Challenges

    The effectiveness of a contemporary defence system depends on the extent to which strategic objectives, threat assessments, military planning, resource allocation, and performance monitoring are consistently connected. Capability development is a long-term process requiring not only financial resources but also institutional continuity, clearly defined priorities, professional personnel, and effective decision-making.The importance of strategic planning is reflected in Georgia’s publicly available defence policy documents. The Ministry of Defence’s Vision 2030 establishes long-term directions for institutional development, while the Strategic Defence Review 2021–2025 was based on an assessment of the operational environment, the identification of challenges facing the defence system, and an examination of force structure and capability gaps. The document also outlined development priorities, required resources, responsible organisational units, and implementation timelines. This approach is important because it seeks to link capability development to established strategic objectives rather than treating defence development as a collection of isolated procurement activities or short-term decisions.Nevertheless, the existence of a strategic document does not, in itself, demonstrate that its provisions have been fully implemented. The quality of planning must ultimately be assessed by examining the extent to which identified priorities have been translated into funded programmes, trained personnel, operational systems, and measurable results.

    The implementation period of the Strategic Defence Review 2021–2025 has concluded. Accordingly, in 2026, particular importance should be attached to assessing how its priorities have been carried forward, what results have been achieved, and whether developments in the security environment have been reflected in subsequent planning cycles. A definitive assessment requires examination of updated strategic documents, implementation reports, and defence programmes. On the basis of publicly available material, it would be inaccurate to claim that the planning process does not exist. A more precise conclusion is that the resilience of Georgia’s defence system requires continuous updating of strategic priorities and systematic assessment of their implementation.One of the major institutional challenges concerns defence resource management. An increase in the defence budget may provide an essential precondition for capability development, but it does not automatically translate into greater military effectiveness. Georgia’s 2026 state budget allocates GEL 1.89 billion to the Ministry of Defence. Assessing this amount solely in nominal terms is insufficient. It is also necessary to examine the distribution of resources among personnel training, weapons and equipment modernisation, logistics, infrastructure, maintenance, research and development, and the long-term sustainment of new capabilities.

    Research on defence resource management highlights the importance of data-driven analysis, organisational capacity, and programme-based budgeting. Such studies can help identify institutional challenges, although they should not be treated as exhaustive descriptions of all ongoing processes. Their practical significance lies in demonstrating the relationship between resource management and strategic planning.Resource allocation must also account for the entire life cycle of military capabilities. Procurement is only the initial stage. Effective use requires trained personnel, spare parts, maintenance, appropriate infrastructure, software, communications, ammunition stocks, and long-term funding for system upgrades. Without these supporting elements, a state may acquire a modern platform whose operational value remains limited.

    A second major challenge concerns institutional continuity. Defence planning cannot be effective if strategic knowledge, experience, and priorities remain associated exclusively with individual officeholders or temporary management teams. The defence system requires institutional memory to preserve previous assessments, lessons learned, planning assumptions, and the outcomes of implemented programmes. Institutional continuity, however, does not imply resistance to change. It means that reforms and organisational adjustments should be based on evidence, clearly defined objectives, and performance monitoring.

    A third challenge concerns coordination between defence institutions and other state agencies. Most contemporary threats extend beyond the mandate of a single institution. Maritime security, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure protection, strategic communications, crisis management, and civilian preparedness require information exchange and coordinated action among defence, internal affairs, state security, foreign affairs, and economic institutions.Interagency coordination should not be evaluated merely through the existence of councils, working groups, or meetings. Its effectiveness should be measured against practical criteria: the speed of information sharing; the availability of a common operational picture; the clarity of responsibilities; the regularity of joint exercises; the effectiveness of crisis decision-making procedures; and the extent to which identified deficiencies are addressed. The Joint Maritime Operations Centre provides an important institutional foundation for coordination in the maritime domain. Its effectiveness, however, should be assessed through practical performance as well as its formal mandate.Human resource management represents another important dimension. A contemporary defence system requires not only sufficient numbers of military personnel but also specialised expertise in cybersecurity, data analysis, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, intelligence, logistics, military engineering, and technical maintenance. Developing and retaining qualified personnel in these fields is a long-term task. It requires professional development, transparent career progression, practical training, and knowledge exchange between military and civilian specialists.

    An institutional assessment of Georgia’s defence system should consequently focus not only on the number of organisational structures or their formal responsibilities, but also on their ability to implement strategic objectives. Defence effectiveness depends on the combined performance of planning, resource management, human capital, interagency coordination, and performance assessment.

    Strategic Intelligence, Early Warning, and Decision-Making

    Strategic intelligence is one of the essential foundations of contemporary defence planning and state decision-making. Its function extends beyond information collection and the preparation of analytical reports: it transforms data from different sources into assessments that enable decision-makers to understand the nature of threats, their potential trajectories, and their possible consequences.Its importance becomes particularly evident when threats evolve rapidly, indicators are fragmented, and the time available for an effective response is limited. Military operations may be preceded by political pressure, information operations, cyber activity, logistical movements, economic restrictions, or suspicious activity targeting critical infrastructure. An individual indicator may not, in itself, signal an imminent threat. The combined assessment of several interconnected indicators, however, may provide the basis for early warning.An effective analytical system should therefore integrate information collection, verification, indicator monitoring, scenario development, and the timely delivery of assessments to decision-making institutions. Relevant sources may include open-source intelligence (OSINT), geospatial data, publicly available economic and transportation information, media monitoring, and other legally accessible material. Open-source analysis cannot replace other intelligence capabilities; its value increases when combined with different forms of data to produce a more comprehensive assessment.

    For Georgia, a principal task is the continuous monitoring of developments in the Black Sea and South Caucasus. This requires attention not only to military activity but also to regional political developments, military procurement, technological change, infrastructure projects, maritime movements, and the information environment. Such an approach makes it possible to examine individual developments within a broader strategic context and assess their potential implications for national interests.Early warning has practical value only when connected to decision-making mechanisms. If an analytical assessment does not reach the appropriate level of decision-making in time, or if it does not inform possible courses of action, information collection cannot provide a genuine defence advantage. The intelligence cycle should therefore culminate in decision support rather than simply in the production of reports.For Georgia’s defence system, an integrated threat-assessment cycle could consist of the following stages:

    Threat → Indicator → Assessment → Scenario → Vulnerability → Capability Gap → Strategic Response

    At the first stage, the potential source and objectives of a threat are identified. The next stage involves determining indicators that may signal its development. Information is then verified and assessed, providing the basis for developing potential scenarios. The analysis subsequently identifies the national interests, infrastructure, or military capabilities that may be affected. Finally, existing capability gaps are assessed and appropriate response options are determined. Quality control is essential throughout this process. Verified facts, source claims, analytical assumptions, and forecasts must be clearly distinguished. Decision-makers should understand not only the conclusions of an assessment but also the reliability of its evidentiary basis, the uncertainties involved, and the additional information that could alter the judgement. This reduces the risks of both underestimating threats and exaggerating their significance.

    The analytical process must also inform defence resource planning. Threat assessments should help determine which capabilities need to be developed, within what timeframe, with what level of resources, and towards which intended outcomes. For example, if an assessment identifies the growing importance of airspace monitoring, unmanned systems, or critical infrastructure protection, these findings should inform corresponding capability development programmes, including personnel training and technical support requirements.Strategic intelligence should therefore not be treated as a separate supporting function detached from the defence system. It is a mechanism for connecting threat assessment with capability development. The quality of this relationship determines how effectively a state can respond not only to an unfolding crisis but also to the indicators that precede it.

    Lessons from the War in Ukraine and the Transformation of Modern Military Deterrence

    Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has highlighted several important lessons for contemporary military theory and practice. The war demonstrates that military effectiveness is not determined solely by heavy weaponry, manpower, or territorial control. The interaction of intelligence, communications, air defence, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, logistics, industrial production, and the speed of military decision-making has become decisive.

    One of the most significant lessons concerns the expanding role of unmanned systems. Unmanned aerial and maritime platforms are used for intelligence gathering, target detection, strikes, disruption of maritime communications, and restrictions on an adversary’s freedom of action. Their effectiveness, however, depends not only on the technical characteristics of individual platforms but also on data transmission, command systems, the ability to operate under electronic warfare conditions, personnel training, and integration with other military capabilities.

    A second lesson concerns air defence and airspace monitoring. Contemporary threats may originate from combat aircraft and cruise missiles as well as relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles. Air defence must therefore follow a layered approach in which different detection and interception capabilities operate in coordination. Procuring expensive systems alone is insufficient if a state lacks the capacity to detect and respond to lower-cost threats through economically sustainable means.

    A third lesson is the growing importance of electronic warfare and cyberspace. Contemporary military operations depend heavily on communication networks, navigation systems, sensors, data exchange, and digital infrastructure. Disruption of these systems can undermine the coordination of military units and slow decision-making. Defence modernisation must therefore incorporate not only new technologies but also their protection, backup capabilities, and continued functionality under conditions of disruption.

    The fourth lesson concerns logistics and the sustainability of defence production. In a prolonged conflict, military capabilities depend on the continuous supply of ammunition, spare parts, fuel, maintenance, and personnel. Modern equipment cannot provide a long-term advantage if a state is unable to sustain and operate it throughout an extended crisis. Defence planning must therefore assess not only initial procurement costs but also the full life-cycle costs of systems and the resilience of supply chains.

    Ukraine’s experience also demonstrates that military and civilian resilience are closely interconnected. The functioning of critical infrastructure, the restoration of energy supplies, public information, the preparedness of local administrations, and the continuity of state institutions directly affect a country’s defence capacity. National resilience is therefore not merely a supporting mechanism for the armed forces; it is an integral component of deterrence and defence.Applying these lessons to Georgia requires caution. Georgia’s geographical, military, economic, and political circumstances differ from those of Ukraine, making the mechanical transfer of the Ukrainian model inappropriate. Its relevance lies instead in identifying principles that can inform Georgia’s defence planning: strengthening early warning, developing unmanned-system capabilities, improving airspace monitoring, enhancing electronic and cyber resilience, ensuring logistical sustainability, protecting critical infrastructure, and strengthening military-civilian coordination.The concept of modern deterrence has also expanded in response to these developments. Traditionally, deterrence was understood as the ability to impose military costs on an adversary sufficient to make aggression unacceptable. This remains important, but it is now complemented by the ability to detect threats in a timely manner, maintain command and communication systems, protect critical infrastructure, withstand cyber and information pressure, and restore damaged capabilities rapidly.

    For Georgia, deterrence should be based on a realistic objective: reducing the conditions favourable to potential aggression and increasing its anticipated costs and consequences. This does not imply that the country can independently neutralise every possible military threat. Rather, it entails building a defence system that complicates aggression planning, reduces the element of surprise, preserves essential state functions during a crisis, and enables coordinated action with international partners.

    Priority Areas for Georgia’s Defence Modernisation

    Georgia’s defence modernisation should be guided by threat assessment and systematic capability gap analysis. The objective should not be to acquire every available technology simultaneously or to create the broadest possible list of military capabilities. Under conditions of limited resources, priorities must be clearly established, implemented in stages, and assessed against measurable outcomes.

    First priority — Strengthening strategic intelligence and early warning. Georgia requires continuous analytical assessment of the Black Sea and South Caucasus security environments, integrating military, political, economic, technological, and informational data. Particular importance should be attached to indicator-based monitoring, scenario development, and the timely delivery of assessments to decision-makers. Open-source intelligence, geospatial data, digital data-processing tools, and interagency information exchange are particularly important in this regard.

    Second priority — Airspace monitoring and layered air defence. The proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, and other airborne threats requires an integrated system for detection, identification, tracking, and response. Priorities should include radar coverage, mobile sensors, passive detection capabilities, and interoperability among different classes of air defence systems. The economic efficiency of response mechanisms must also be considered to avoid the unnecessary use of expensive systems against comparatively low-cost threats.

    Third priority — Unmanned systems and counter-unmanned capabilities. Georgia should develop indigenous unmanned capabilities for intelligence and other mission-specific purposes, alongside the means to detect, track, and counter adversarial unmanned systems. Emphasis should be placed on system integration, personnel training, data exchange, operation under electronic interference, and local maintenance. Development should extend beyond platform procurement to include the necessary doctrinal, organisational, and training arrangements.

    Fourth priority — Cybersecurity and electronic resilience. The digital transformation of the defence system creates opportunities to improve effectiveness but also introduces new vulnerabilities. Military command-and-control systems, communication networks, logistics databases, and the digital management of critical infrastructure require continuous protection. Essential measures include network security audits, incident-response procedures, backup communication channels, and the maintenance of operational continuity during cyber incidents.

    Fifth priority — Maritime domain awareness and critical infrastructure protection. Georgia should strengthen its capacity to collect, analyse, and share information concerning maritime activity. Cooperation between the Joint Maritime Operations Centre and relevant institutions should be deepened through improved information-sharing procedures and joint exercises. The protection of ports, energy facilities, transportation hubs, and communication networks should be based on risk assessment, integrated physical and digital security, alternative capabilities, and recovery plans.

    Sixth priority — Territorial defence and national resilience. Georgia’s defence system should incorporate civilian preparedness, the functioning of local administrations, public information during crises, and the continuity of critical services alongside military operations. Territorial defence capabilities should be linked to clearly defined responsibilities, training systems, logistical support, and central military command. National resilience must be reflected in practical plans, exercises, and response procedures rather than remaining a declarative principle.

    Seventh priority — Human capital and the defence technology ecosystem. Military modernisation requires the training and retention of specialised personnel. Professional expertise should be developed in cybersecurity, data analysis, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, military engineering, technical maintenance, and logistics. Cooperation with universities, research centres, and the private technology sector is particularly important. The development of domestic technological capabilities should be based on realistic assessments, clearly defined requirements, and quality control.

    Eighth priority — Defence resource management and performance assessment. Every major defence programme should be linked to an identified threat, a specific capability gap, an implementation timeframe, and measurable outcomes. It is essential to account for the full life cycle of procurement, assess programme implementation periodically, and align resource allocation with strategic priorities. The effectiveness of the defence budget should be measured not merely by expenditure or the quantity of equipment acquired, but by the extent to which the country’s actual readiness to address identified threats has improved.

    Implementation of these priorities should follow a phased approach. In the short term, priority should be given to auditing existing capabilities, updating threat assessments, mapping critical infrastructure risks, and reviewing interagency response procedures. In the medium term, attention should focus on integrating intelligence and sensor capabilities, improving responses to air and unmanned threats, training specialised personnel, and conducting joint exercises. In the long term, priorities should include developing the technological ecosystem, strengthening defence-industrial and logistical resilience, institutionalising military-civilian coordination, and continuously updating defence planning.

    Georgia’s Integrated Defence and Strategic Resilience Framework (IDSR-G)

    The challenges outlined above demonstrate the need for an integrated analytical framework that connects threat assessment, military capability development, and national resilience. To address this need, the article introduces the author-developed Integrated Defence and Strategic Resilience Framework for Georgia (IDSR-G). Its purpose is to assess Georgia’s defence system not only through its individual components but also through the relationships among them.The framework is based on the assumption that contemporary defence effectiveness depends on the coordinated functioning of five principal dimensions.

    First dimension — Strategic intelligence and early warning. This component encompasses threat detection, information collection and verification, indicator monitoring, scenario development, and the provision of timely assessments to decision-makers. Its evaluation criteria include information reliability, analytical speed, interagency information exchange, forecasting quality, and the ability to translate assessments into practical decisions.

    Second dimension — Military capabilities. This dimension encompasses the readiness of the armed forces, command-and-control systems, intelligence and monitoring capabilities, air and coastal defence, unmanned systems, cyber and electronic resilience, logistics, and personnel training. The central assessment question is not simply which systems the country possesses, but whether they can operate in an integrated manner under specific threat conditions.

    Third dimension — Institutional resilience. This component refers to continuity in strategic planning, clear allocation of responsibilities, effective resource management, retention of professional personnel, development of institutional memory, and interagency coordination. It ensures that defence capabilities do not depend exclusively on individual officeholders or temporary organisational arrangements.

    Fourth dimension — Deterrence and national resilience. This dimension integrates military deterrence, critical infrastructure protection, civilian preparedness, continuity of state functions, crisis management, and the ability to restore damaged capabilities. Its objective is to reduce the anticipated benefits of aggression for an adversary while strengthening the state’s ability to withstand pressure and maintain essential functions.

    Fifth dimension — Strategic partnerships. This component includes cooperation with NATO, bilateral partners, and regional actors; military education; exercises; interoperability; technological exchange; and defence capability development. Partnerships are regarded as a means of strengthening national capabilities through knowledge, experience, and interoperability, but they cannot replace the state’s own defence responsibilities.The five dimensions are interdependent. Strategic intelligence identifies threats requiring particular attention; military capabilities provide the means to respond; institutional resilience establishes the organisational basis for planning and employing those capabilities; national resilience helps maintain essential state functions during a crisis; and strategic partnerships strengthen national capabilities through knowledge, experience, and interoperability.

    IDSR-G is designed as an interconnected assessment cycle rather than a linear sequence of independent components. This makes it possible to evaluate deficiencies in one dimension in relation to their effects on the overall defence system.The framework can be used for periodic assessments of Georgia’s defence capabilities. Each dimension should be evaluated against predefined indicators. Strategic intelligence, for example, could be assessed through the frequency of threat-indicator updates, the accuracy of analytical assessments, and the time required to deliver information. Military capabilities could be examined through readiness levels, system interoperability, personnel training, and technical support. Institutional resilience could be evaluated through the continuity of the planning cycle, clarity of responsibilities, and programme implementation. National resilience could be assessed through continuity plans for critical services, joint exercises, and recovery capabilities. Strategic partnerships could be measured through the outcomes of joint exercises, interoperability levels, and the capabilities developed through cooperation.The practical value of IDSR-G lies in its ability to turn defence assessment into a process for identifying specific deficiencies and development priorities. If threat assessments are of a high standard but the corresponding military capabilities are absent, the problem cannot be addressed exclusively within the intelligence domain. If modern equipment has been procured but personnel training and technical maintenance have not been ensured, the capability gap lies in institutional and resource management arrangements. Similarly, if critical infrastructure protection plans exist but information exchange and joint agency responses remain insufficient, the problem must be assessed in terms of coordination and national resilience.

    The framework therefore focuses not on the formal existence of individual components but on their functional interconnection. It does not constitute an officially approved doctrine of Georgia’s defence system or an existing state policy. Rather, it is an analytical framework proposed by the author. Its further development and practical application would require detailed indicator definitions, the systematisation of publicly available data, and periodic assessments of defence capabilities.

    Conclusion

    The transformation of the Black Sea security environment has presented Georgia’s defence policy with new strategic and institutional challenges. The war in Ukraine, the extensive use of unmanned systems, the diversification of threats in the air and maritime domains, growing cyber and information pressure, and the increasing importance of critical infrastructure protection have demonstrated that contemporary defence effectiveness cannot be determined solely by the quantity of military resources.For Georgia, the central challenge is to develop a defence system capable of responding to its strategic geographical position, regional transit function, and complex security environment. Such a system must support timely threat assessment, military readiness, institutional continuity, and the uninterrupted functioning of essential national services. Russia’s military presence in the occupied territories and persistent security challenges along the occupation lines remain enduring factors in defence planning. At the same time, the growth of military and commercial risks in the Black Sea requires stronger maritime security, critical infrastructure protection, and interagency coordination.

    The research demonstrates that a principal prerequisite for defence transformation is the integration of strategic intelligence and early warning into military planning and resource allocation. Threat assessment acquires practical defence value only when it leads to the identification of specific capability gaps, corresponding development programmes, responsible institutions, and performance criteria. Without this connection, strategic documents risk remaining declaratory, while procurement may develop into a series of disconnected projects.The analysis identifies several priority areas for Georgia’s defence modernisation: strengthening strategic intelligence and early warning; developing airspace monitoring and layered air defence; integrating unmanned systems and counter-unmanned capabilities; ensuring cybersecurity and electronic resilience; improving maritime domain awareness and critical infrastructure protection; developing territorial defence and civilian preparedness; retaining specialised personnel; and establishing results-oriented defence resource management.Cooperation with NATO and other partners remains an important foundation for developing Georgia’s defence capabilities. Partnership facilitates military interoperability, professional development, institutional reform, and the exchange of experience. Nevertheless, in the absence of NATO membership and the associated collective defence guarantee, the development of national capabilities and domestic resilience assumes particular importance. International support should complement national defence capacity rather than replace it.


    The article’s proposed Integrated Defence and Strategic Resilience Framework for Georgia (IDSR-G) brings together five interconnected dimensions: strategic intelligence and early warning; military capabilities; institutional resilience; deterrence and national resilience; and strategic partnerships. Its principal analytical contribution lies in assessing the defence system not through individual resources or organisational structures in isolation, but through their interaction and their contribution to an integrated strategic outcome.Ultimately, Georgia’s defence transformation should be understood not as a process of accumulating military assets, but as the development of an integrated national capacity to anticipate threats, deter aggression, sustain essential state functions, and adapt to an increasingly complex regional security environment.



    Military Analyst

    Tatia KHUNTUA


    #GEORGIA

    12.11.2026 07:58





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