On November 19, speaking at parliamentary hearings in Ankara, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared that his country does not intend to open its border with Armenia until a final Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty is signed. According to the minister, opening the border prematurely would reduce Armenia’s incentive to respond to Baku’s demands, potentially slowing the negotiation process. Recall that the August 8 Washington Peace Declaration has only been initialed, and for its final signing Baku has set as a precondition the amendment of Armenia’s Constitution – a process that is lengthy and procedurally difficult. Moreover, an examination of Azerbaijani diplomacy over the past thirty years shows that almost always, at the very last moment – when all points appear agreed upon – Baku, anticipating additional concessions, introduces new preconditions and demands, deliberately destabilizing the process. This justifies, at the very least, suspicion that Armenia will hardly achieve the signing of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan simply by amending its Constitution. The emergence of new demands such as enclaves or the “return” of so-called Western Azerbaijanis – is not excluded, which would again delay the peace process and preserve Armenia’s isolation.  

This is why the widely promoted TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) project, which is ostensibly meant to open a new page of peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus, could produce for Armenia a unique TACO (Trump Always Chicken Out) effect – changing practically nothing in terms of its regional role. There is a real danger that Armenia may find itself in a diplomatic trap: its territory could be used for launching the TRIPP route, while it receives nothing in return and continues to remain in a “no war, no peace” environment, encircled from both the east and west. Below, we will examine why this risk is highly realistic and what steps Armenia might take to prevent such an outcome.

The Asymmetries of TRIPP: What Does it Mean for Armenia?

Although the TRIPP project is presented as a platform for stability, cooperation, and regional integration, political realities in the South Caucasus highlight disproportionate advantages for the participating states. The August 8 agreement legalizes Azerbaijan’s right to secure an uninterrupted road to Nakhichevan and Turkey, while Armenia’s anticipated benefits remain conditional, uncertain, or left to future negotiations. This asymmetry – rooted in Armenia’s defeat in the 44-day war and the imbalance of power –puts Armenia at risk of becoming a transit corridor for others without receiving any meaningful gains from regional de-blockade.

Essentially, the provision of a route by Armenia is perceived by Azerbaijan more as a concession in exchange for peace, rather than as the “crossroads of peace” narrative promoted by Armenia’s leadership. TRIPP is designed in a way that prioritizes east–west connectivity, ensuring unimpeded passage between Turkey and Azerbaijan across Armenian territory. Despite the reciprocity principle embedded in the Washington agreement, Armenia currently lacks the geopolitical resources to secure effective participation in the TRIPP project.

While U.S. involvement provides an additional layer of international oversight, the absence of legally binding obligations makes it possible to operate the project without Armenia’s active participation. The United States has broader regional interests, including developing connectivity with Central Asian states, and may prioritize the stable functioning of the route as part of these objectives. Azerbaijan may selectively fulfill its commitments, temporarily suspend cooperation, or introduce new demands without facing serious consequences, whereas Armenia will be obliged to ensure uninterrupted TRIPP operation under its obligations.

Washington itself is pursuing its own interests in Central Asia and is strongly invested in TRIPP’s stable functioning. Recently, during a summit with the leaders of the five Central Asian states, the U.S. concluded multibillion-dollar agreements on energetics, critical and rare-earth mineral extraction, with the logistical transport of these resources expected to take place specifically via the TRIPP route. The stakes are exceedingly high, and in case of conflicts of interest, the U.S. is unlikely to prioritize Armenia’s rights.

Meanwhile, after TRIPP begins operation, it is highly possible that Azerbaijan will prolong the peace process, keeping Armenia in a state of uncertainty and continued isolation, while extracting further concessions. And for this Baku may have two strategic reasons:

1. To preserve the image of Armenia as an enemy, a fundamental tool for internal consolidation in authoritarian regimes like Azerbaijan. Armenians have served as the “ideal enemy” for centuries and will continue to be used to cement the ruling regime with militarization and expansionist tendencies.
2. To advance the “return of Western Azerbaijanis” narrative. Azerbaijan is already institutionalizing this agenda by funding propaganda, academic, and demographic studies about Azerbaijanis who lived in Armenia before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Baku demands security guarantees for their “return,” aiming to alter Armenia’s monoethnic demographic profile and create future conditions for destabilizing Armenia from within.

Thus, Azerbaijan is not genuinely interested either in signing a peace treaty with Armenia or in Armenia’s participation in TRIPP. What Turkey and Azerbaijan had long sought – an unobstructed corridor connecting them – was promised through the initialing of the Washington agreements. The construction of the Kars–Dilucu–Igdir railway, which began immediately after the signing, clearly demonstrates that Turkey and Azerbaijan are not considering including the existing Nakhichevan–Armenia railway (Yeraskh–Gyumri/Akhurik–Kars) in the Middle Corridor. Both states openly ignore Armenia’s repeated proposals to use its infrastructure for cargo transportation between them. Baku views the TRIPP route through Syunik solely as a passageway, not as a regional cooperation project. At most, Azerbaijan may allow indirect cargo transfers to Armenia –similar to the earlier Kazakh and Russian wheat shipments.

Possible Measures Armenia Can Consider

On November 14, during a conference organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Yerevan, Prime Minister Pashinyan presented several details about the TRIPP implementation. A joint Armenian–American company is to be created, leasing land for TRIPP projects for 49 or 99 years. The land will remain property of the Republic of Armenia, which will retain a superior voting right on all strategic decisions, including investor selection. The project will include not only the construction of a railway in southern Syunik but also power transmission lines, energy pipelines, and roadways. Documentation is expected to be finalized in the first half of 2026, with construction beginning in the second half. Throughout his speech, the Prime Minister emphasized Armenia’s sovereignty over all projects.

Nevertheless, despite assurances that TRIPP will contribute to broad regional unblocking, there are no realistic grounds to substantiate these claims. The Armenian-American company that is to be established is primarily intended to unilaterally unblock the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan, ensuring transit communication for Turkey, Azerbaijan, and other interested parties through Syunik. Meanwhile, there are simply no legally binding mechanisms guaranteeing reciprocal passage for Armenian cargo or vehicles. The balance of power and the geopolitical environment place Armenia not as an equal party to the agreement, but rather as a supporting and facilitating side.

It is clear that Armenia does not have sufficient resources to impose its participation or demand legal mechanisms. Even so, it still has the possibility of taking a number of strategic steps to avoid ending up in a “hostage-like” position. In this sense, the creation of alternative transport routes is essential.

As it happens, in the current conditions, Syunik has gained exceptional geopolitical significance, and interest in transit routes passing through the region is high. For Armenia, Syunik represents a strategic asset whose effective management may influence the country’s long-term regional status. Developing alternative routes in and through Syunik could help balance existing initiatives, reducing Armenia’s dependence on any single project and decreasing the risks associated with unilateral implementation.

Considering TRIPP’s current asymmetry, Armenia can more actively encourage the broader participation of other regional power centers in constructing alternative routes in Syunik – while at the same time reducing their concerns about the strengthening of Turkish-Azerbaijani and American influence. Diversifying transport routes would allow Armenia to view TRIPP as an additional opportunity rather than a vital dependency that could become a tool of political coercion. Even if at some point in the future Armenia gains the ability to benefit from TRIPP, Azerbaijan – facing no alternatives – will demand an extremely high political and economic price from Armenia.

The primary issue here is the construction of an Armenia–Iran railway independent of Azerbaijan, a project which plans and calculations have long existed. Yet for various reasons its implementation has repeatedly been frozen. Today its necessity is more urgent than ever, as it would provide Armenia not only with access to the world through Iran and its ports, but also with a direct link to Syunik itself. This is a matter of paramount importance, because with the launch of TRIPP, unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan will obtain a railway connection to Syunik – with all the resulting consequences.

Of course, for a country that has been building the North–South strategic highway for 13 years and has not even completed half of it, the implementation of alternative transport megaprojects may seem challenging. Nevertheless, it is crucial for Armenia’s leadership to understand that passivity in the current situation will leave the country on the margins of future developments. The South Caucasus is now entering a new era of great-power competition, where the interests of diverse geopolitical actors will collide. Moreover, there is a real danger that this clash of interests could trigger prolonged domestic instability in Armenia, continuously fragmenting and weakening the country’s resilience and development potential.

Specialist in politico-military and security affairs,

Hovhannes Vardanyan

#ARMENIA

03.12.2025 07:30