In the summer of 2026, Armenia is expected to hold parliamentary elections that are no longer merely a domestic political event but are turning into a battleground of external interests and competing visions for the country’s future. In essence, these elections are becoming a referendum on Armenia’s foreign policy orientation: whether it will continue deepening cooperation with the West or attempt to return to Russia’s sphere of influence.

Armenia, having endured the devastating 44-day war and the forced displacement of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh, has remained in a state of permanent turbulence over the past five years. Azerbaijani military attacks on its sovereign territory, a security system crisis, attempts at internal destabilization, and the loss of trust in traditional allies have generated profound public disillusionment — both with the government and the opposition.

According to a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) between June 16 and 25, 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan holds the highest trust rating at 13%. Compared to the previous IRI survey, his rating has decreased by three percentage points — from 16% in 2024. Approximately 1,500 Armenian citizens participated in the poll.

The survey data show that Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan ranks second with 5%, while former President Robert Kocharyan is in third place. As of June, Kocharyan’s rating stands at 4%, compared to 2% recorded in September of the previous year.

It is also noteworthy that at the time of the survey, the leader of the “Mer Dzrevov” (“In Our Own Way”) movement, Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, had not yet announced his political participation, and his name was not included among the respondents’ options.

At the same time, 61% of respondents stated that they trust none of the political leaders. The survey also revealed signs of growing political apathy among young people: 37% of citizens aged 18 to 35 said they would not participate in the vote.

The Struggle of External Centers of Influence

The political field is clearly polarizing. The incumbent authorities are consistently strengthening ties with the EU, the United States, and other Western partners, while a significant part of the opposition openly advocates a “return to Russia” as the sole security guarantee. However, public disappointment with Russia following the events of 2020–2023 remains extremely high.

Meanwhile, Russian and pro-Russian media are actively shaping an alternative narrative, placing responsibility for all defeats and crises personally on Nikol Pashinyan — from the lost war to the “loss of Artsakh” and the overall weakening of the state.

The thesis that the current government is leading Armenia toward “Turkification” and the destruction of statehood through normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey is being widely circulated. Part of society perceives these claims as plausible, making the information space particularly vulnerable.

Against this backdrop, the 2026 elections are increasingly becoming an arena for competition among external power centers. According to OC Media, citing Russian sources, the Kremlin plans to allocate around $165 million to strengthen its “soft power” in CIS countries, especially Armenia, with the process reportedly coordinated by Sergey Kiriyenko. The strategic objective is to restore lost influence ahead of the elections.

In parallel, the European Union has announced €15 million in funding to counter hybrid threats and protect Armenia’s democratic institutions. Thus, this is not merely a classic electoral competition but a clash between two models of the country’s future.

Moscow’s Rhetoric

Between December 2024 and January 2026, statements by Sergey Lavrov, Vladimir Solovyov, and Alexander Dugin demonstrate a noticeable evolution in tone — from dissatisfaction to direct threats, echoing rhetoric previously used regarding Ukraine and Georgia on the eve of crises.

The political dimension includes support for pro-Russian networks, opaque financing, exploitation of the Karabakh tragedy, and attempts to organize anti-Western street protests. Economic leverage remains a powerful tool as well: energy dependence, remittances from migrant workers accounting for up to 15–20% of GDP, and potential trade restrictions.

The information space is saturated with content from Russian media outlets such as Sputnik Armenia and RT, as well as local pro-Russian channels. Bots and trolls are actively used. The most widespread fakes include claims that Pashinyan is a “traitor” and a “Western agent”, that the EU will “abandon Armenia,” and that the EU monitoring mission consists of “spies and agents of influence”.

From 2023 to 2026, a series of cyberattacks targeting Armenian government and media resources has been recorded. Experts link these attacks to groups associated with Russian structures, including APT28 and APT29.

The Western Response

In contrast to Russia’s $165 million, the EU will provide €15 million to combat hybrid attacks in Armenia. These funds are intended for demining training, confidence-building in the region, and, most importantly, identifying, analyzing, and responding to foreign interference.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas stated that the EU would assist Armenia in countering “harmful foreign interference” during the 2026 parliamentary elections, as it did in Moldova. These remarks triggered an angry response from Lavrov, who claimed that the Moldovan scenario involved “gross falsifications at diaspora polling stations.”

Western assistance includes OSCE/ODIHR observer missions, cybersecurity technical support, media literacy programs, and fact-checking initiatives. However, the scale of this support is significantly smaller than the resources Russia is prepared to allocate to maintain its influence.

Expert Opinions

Political scientist Stepan Safaryan believes that the main outcome of the elections will be the determination of Armenia’s geopolitical trajectory. “Russia’s interest in this issue is growing by the day. Since its security leverage over Armenia has weakened and there are currently no border attacks from Azerbaijan, hybrid threats have intensified and will continue to intensify”, he notes. According to him, the government’s response to hybrid attacks and disinformation has accelerated in recent years.

He argues that Russia will rely on forces within Armenia capable of preventing a Western course — both openly pro-Russian and covert actors, including some nominally pro-Western representatives.

“The first group openly warns of the dangers of the West and the need to return to Russia. The leader of this pole is former President Robert Kocharyan, who has stated that Trump’s path poses a threat to Armenia. There are also forces that do not openly oppose Western integration but prefer Russia and will do everything to derail this path. This includes the force associated with Samvel Karapetyan, who suggests that Russia and China should be involved in Trump’s route. A third camp consists of pseudo-pro-Western forces that may attempt to raise noise about election fraud,” Safaryan emphasized.

Political analyst Hakob Badalyan notes that hybrid attacks and external influence have accompanied every electoral process in Armenia. “Not only Armenia, but essentially any state with limited capabilities becomes an object of competition among major power centers,” he says. According to him, resilience depends on the quality of elites and institutions — both of which Armenia lacks, making external influence highly probable.

Warning from Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service

Ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections, Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service issued a report warning of intensified hybrid threats and a sharp increase in external interference in domestic political processes. The document states that the current year is likely to become a period of informational “preparation” aimed at artificially imposing a false dilemma of an unavoidable geopolitical choice on society.

According to Hovsep Khurshudyan, head of the NGO “Free Citizen,” Russia is the primary source of these threats. He points to statements by Vladimir Solovyov and Alexander Dugin, who have suggested that Armenia “cannot be a sovereign state”.

Khurshudyan believes Moscow is pursuing two objectives: at maximum, to change the government in Armenia; at minimum, to delegitimize the election results and undermine Armenia’s relations with the West.

Hidden Lines of Influence and Pressure Scenarios

The 2026 parliamentary elections increasingly resemble not an ordinary electoral cycle but a complex political-institutional test intertwining external influence, elite fragmentation, and a crisis of trust.

Traditional pro-Russian figures such as Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan retain recognition but struggle to mobilize broad support, as their names are associated with corruption and past failures. Attempts are underway to introduce less discredited actors — technocrats, former diplomats, and second-tier managers — whose rhetoric emphasizes “realism” and “multi-vector policy” while subtly echoing pro-Russian narratives.

So-called “sleeper” media resources — regional websites, Telegram channels, YouTube platforms, and Facebook pages — may be activated for coordinated information campaigns. Some are registered outside Armenia, complicating oversight.

Beyond the Karabakh trauma, new emotional triggers are being tested: narratives about “loss of sovereignty,” demographic decline, youth emigration, rising prices, and “cultural erosion.” Religious rhetoric has also intensified, portraying the Church as the “last bastion of the nation”.

Party financing remains a sensitive issue. Many political forces rely not on membership fees but on external support, including business networks connected to Russia. Even with expanded oversight powers granted to anti-corruption bodies, full transparency over financial flows — including charitable foundations and affiliated structures — remains difficult to achieve.

Pashinyan’s Statement on the Church

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan recently stated that there is information suggesting that shadow funds are entering Armenia through structures of the Armenian Apostolic Church for political purposes. He sharply criticized the politicization of the Church, emphasizing the need for financial transparency and accountability.

Vulnerable Regions and Institutional Weaknesses

Regions such as Shirak, Lori, parts of Aragatsotn and Kotayk, as well as border settlements, are considered particularly vulnerable to manipulation due to socio-economic challenges and migration patterns.

Delegitimization Instead of Direct Fraud

The primary threat is not necessarily ballot manipulation but an information strategy aimed at undermining trust in the electoral process itself — creating the perception of a stolen result regardless of the outcome.

The Street as a Backup Scenario

Post-election street mobilization is seen as a potential pressure mechanism, framed as a defense of democracy or a protest against alleged fraud. Unlike previous cycles, the focus may be on decentralized protest networks rather than a single charismatic leader.

 

In sum, Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections are unfolding under multiple layers of pressure — external, institutional, and ideological. The contest is not only for power but for competing interpretations of the country’s future, with public trust in democratic procedures becoming the key battleground.

Journalist,

Marine Kharatyan

#ARMENIA

20.02.2026 04:06