The ongoing unrest in Iran, although somewhat suppressed on the streets, continues to exert significant political, economic, and social influence on the South Caucasus countries. Despite Tehran reasserting control through harsh repressive measures, structural instability persists in the country. For neighboring states, especially Armenia and Azerbaijan, this represents a multilayered challenge that goes beyond Iran’s domestic politics.

Iranian authorities have resorted to overwhelming force to curb mass protests. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei publicly acknowledged that “thousands” of people died during the unrest, while characterizing the protests as a foreign-organized “rebellious activity”. Independent media and international sources report mass arrests, the use of firearms, prolonged internet shutdowns, and near-total control over information as key tools of suppression.

According to the latest reports from Tehran, demonstrations have effectively disappeared from the streets. However, this apparent “calm” reflects not normalization but intimidation. Security measures have been tightened on the streets, businesses close earlier than usual, and an atmosphere of fear dominates the cities. Thousands of protest participants remain in custody, and the high cost of participation — lethal force and communication restrictions — has effectively frozen street mobilization without resolving underlying problems. It is precisely this ongoing instability that makes neighboring countries vulnerable to secondary effects.

Armenia: High Vulnerability

Among the South Caucasus countries, Armenia is in the zone of highest potential risk. The risks are political, economic, and humanitarian in nature.

From a migration perspective, Armenia can serve both as a destination and as a transit route. Western countries, including the United States and Canada, have already advised their citizens to leave Iran via Armenia or Turkey due to disruptions in air travel and communications. The main land crossing is the Agarak-Meghri route.

Armenian authorities face a serious information deficit. According to the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs, direct interaction with the Armenian community in Iran has become impossible. Information mainly comes through people crossing the border, indicating that the situation inside the country is far from normalized despite the absence of mass protests.

Demographic and economic factors further complicate the situation. Armenia is still hosting more than 100,000 displaced persons from Nagorno-Karabakh following the events of September 2023. Housing, healthcare, education, and labor market systems are under significant pressure. There have been no official statements regarding the reception of Iranian refugees, but political and public readiness will likely depend on the scale and composition of incoming individuals. Ethnic Armenians returning from Iran would face less resistance than a significant number of non-Armenian refugees, which could heavily strain already overstretched systems.

The Iranian Armenian community — estimated at 60-80 thousand people, mainly in Tehran and the New Julfa district of Isfahan — adds another layer of sensitivity. At least two Armenians have reportedly died during the unrest. While mass movement has not yet been observed, Armenian authorities do not rule out evacuation of the community if the situation worsens.

Strategically, Armenia cannot afford to break ties with Iran. Tehran is an important trading partner and a critical land corridor, especially given the closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Any restriction or tightening of control at the Iranian border would have an immediate economic impact. Politically, Iran has traditionally supported the status quo in the region, indirectly aligning with Armenia’s interests in relations with Azerbaijan. Thus, Yerevan faces a delicate balance: protecting its population and borders while avoiding any demonstration of support for foreign intervention or regime change.

Domestically, instability in Iran may affect the political situation ahead of parliamentary elections in June 2026. Syunik Province — already a sensitive area due to tensions with Azerbaijan — could become a focal point for security issues. The opposition may interpret any problems with migrants or border control as government inability to handle crises.

Azerbaijan: Border Security, Ethnic Sensitivity, and Logistics

Azerbaijan’s vulnerability is determined by geography, ethnic connections, and the country’s role in regional logistics. During the 2025 conflict between Iran and Israel, Azerbaijan served as the main humanitarian corridor for foreigners leaving Iran. This precedent indicates that, with continued instability, Baku could again face pressure from Iranian citizens and third countries seeking temporary refuge.

A particularly sensitive factor is the large ethnic Azerbaijani community in northern Iran. Cultural and linguistic ties make it difficult for Azerbaijani authorities to remain indifferent to events abroad. Internal pressure on the government to protect ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran may increase — something Tehran views with suspicion.

From a security perspective, prolonged instability could create uncertainty along the southern border, affecting border protection, energy infrastructure security, and regional diplomacy. Economically, Iran’s stability directly impacts Azerbaijan’s role as a logistics hub. The country services a key segment of the International North-South Transport Corridor connecting Russia to Iran and further to South Asia. Disruptions in Iran could reduce transit flows and associated revenues.

Georgia: Indirect but Manageable Consequences

Georgia, which does not share a direct border with Iran, faces fewer immediate risks. Indirect effects are possible through migration and transit. With continued instability, Iranian citizens and third-country nationals may enter via Armenia and use Georgia as a transit corridor to Europe or Turkey. This could place additional pressure on border and migration controls, although it is unlikely to constitute a serious security crisis.

Economically, Georgia is less vulnerable. Trade with Iran is significantly lower than that of Armenia or Azerbaijan. The main area of economic interaction is tourism, historically generating modest revenue. Therefore, even prolonged instability in Iran is unlikely to significantly affect the tourism sector.

Conclusion: Unequal Risks Across the Region

Unrest in Iran creates a source of ongoing uncertainty for the South Caucasus, but the impact is unevenly distributed. Armenia and Azerbaijan, with land borders and close economic and cultural ties to Iran, are far more vulnerable than Georgia.

For Armenia, the risks encompass humanitarian burdens, economic disruption, and political challenges ahead of elections. For Azerbaijan, the main concerns are border security, ethnic, and logistical challenges. Georgia remains relatively protected due to geography and limited economic dependence.

Suppression of protests in Iran has reduced their visibility but has not decreased regional risk. As long as structural instability persists, the South Caucasus will continue to feel indirect consequences, testing the countries’ ability to manage crises and navigate diplomatic and humanitarian challenges differently.

International Analyst,
Mariana Shafrazyan

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30.01.2026 01:01