On August 8, in Washington According to the peace agreement pre-signed with Azerbaijan, Armenia commits, under U.S. supervision, to provide an unobstructed route through Syunik for the Azerbaijani side to connect with its Nakhichevan enclave. This project is known as TRIPP, or Trump’s Route.

Under the November 10, 2020 trilateral declaration, Armenia had already undertaken the obligation to provide Azerbaijan with an unobstructed route as part of the process of unblocking regional communication lines, under the control of Russian border guards. In 2021, a trilateral commission of deputy prime ministers was even created to coordinate the necessary steps toward opening communication routes.

However, as is known, those agreements remained on paper, followed by Azerbaijan’s attacks on Armenia’s sovereign territory in 2021–2022, and later by the complete occupation and depopulation of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh).

Therefore, a natural question arises: Will the second attempt to open a route through Syunik succeed, given its geostrategic importance and the changes that such a route could bring to the region? Is it possible that once again, the implementation of agreements will be continually delayed, leading to a new escalation in the South Caucasus? Below, we will attempt to discuss potential risks and assess foreseeable scenarios.

Risks Generated by TRIPP

By the end of August, the main beneficiary of this agreement — Turkey — seeking to quickly materialize the arrangements, announced the start of construction of the 224-km Kars – Dilucu railway, which will connect Turkey to Azerbaijan’s main territory through Nakhichevan and Syunik, ensuring further access to the Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia.

The new railway, which will surpass the Kars–Tbilisi–Baku line in capacity and have bidirectional transit functionality, holds great strategic significance for the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem. The operation of TRIPP will strengthen their position in the Eurasian geopolitical landscape, creating a new reality and balance of power in the South Caucasus, where traditional players like Russia and Iran will have a more marginal role. Unlike the November 10 declaration, which involved other regional players in the unblocking process, TRIPP has a much more unilateral character, mainly serving Turkish-Azerbaijani interests while simultaneously involving American presence.

It should be noted that the risks of TRIPP for Russia and Iran are not limited to the mere reduction of their influence in the South Caucasus; they could have far deeper consequences, provoking strong counterreactions. Such responses could paralyze the entire process, plunging the region into turmoil.

Risks for Iran

• The strengthening of Turkish influence in the South Caucasus, accompanied by pan-Turkic rhetoric, creates separatist threats for Iran. Since 2009, the Organization of Turkic States, founded by Ankara and Baku, has been actively used to promote the idea of uniting the Turkic world. In this context, Azerbaijanis living in northern Iran may perceive Ankara’s and Baku’s increasing activity as a signal to act against the central government.
  In 2022, in Samarkand, during a meeting of the organization, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated that the organization’s mission is to protect the rights and interests not only of Turkic populations living within member states but also those living beyond those borders — a direct hint toward Iran, whose population is estimated to be about one-third Azerbaijani¹.
• The implementation of TRIPP will reduce the importance of the railway that passes through Iran’s territory from Central Asia, creating a more profitable alternative. For a country already under sanctions, this brings an additional threat of isolation.
• Iran will lose its monopoly over the connection between Nakhichevan and western Azerbaijan — the so-called “Araz Corridor” — which may cease functioning altogether.
• Armenia’s increased dependence on Turkey and Azerbaijan, due to deepening trade and economic ties, could undermine the security of the route through Syunik for Iran.
• The potential American presence along TRIPP — possibly in the form of private military companies — could be perceived by Iran as a threat and an attempt to encircle the country from the north.

Risks for Russia

• The risk of separatism among Muslims in the North Caucasus, who have traditionally viewed Turkey as a reliable refuge.
• With the opening of the Armenia–Turkey border, the Russian 102nd military base in Gyumri may lose its strategic necessity.
• Armenia could gradually drift away from Russia’s orbit due to inflows of Turkish-Azerbaijani capital and growing economic dependence.
• The American presence near Russia’s southern borders could, in the long term, complicate the movement of Russian energy resources and cargo.

Possible scenarios

Scenario 1: Internal Political Instability and Armed Escalation

The parliamentary elections expected in Armenia in June 2026 present a good opportunity for Russia to reshuffle all the political cards and reshape the political landscape to increase the influence of pro-Russian forces. As a result of the elections, political instability may arise in Armenia, with no single party able to secure a majority, leading to negotiations and bargaining over coalition formation. Even if the pro-Russian forces fail to take power, the weakening of the current government will allow the creation of difficulties in fulfilling Armenia’s TRIPP-related commitments, with demands to consider Russia’s interests as well.

This situation could turn the process upside down, generating new speculations and delays, ultimately leading to military escalation. Azerbaijan and Turkey might resume armed clashes along the entire border—or specifically in Syunik—to force Armenia to accelerate the fulfillment of its obligations. Meanwhile, armed tensions in the region have always provided Moscow the opportunity to reaffirm its importance, act as a mediator, and push forward its own interests. After the tension subsides, a new unblocking agreement may emerge—one that would be more acceptable to the Russian side.

Scenario 2: Preservation of the Status Quo

The August 8 agreement itself contains significant uncertainties. There is no clear roadmap regarding the start and sequence of actions. Moreover, there is no consensus between the parties, even on fundamental concepts, and more than once, remote debates have taken place at the level of national leaders from various high platforms concerning the details of the proposed route.

It remains unclear who will exercise control over the route — whether it will be an American private military organization or Armenian border guards — and what the notion of Armenian sovereignty over the road passing through Syunik actually entails. It is also uncertain which American business circles will make investments and of what kind. These uncertainties lead to ongoing misunderstandings, creating a field for endless negotiations, which may periodically reach deadlocks. Although around three months have passed since the signing of the document, there are still no concrete steps toward the implementation of TRIPP. This scenario may preserve the current status quo for a long time, continually delaying the opening of the route, often leading to increased regional tensions and creating risks for the peace agenda.

Scenario 3: The Threat of Syunik’s Occupation and a Large-Scale Regional War

Next year, Azerbaijan is expected to fully complete construction of the Horadiz–Agbend railway on its territory, through which it plans to connect to Nakhichevan via Armenia’s Syunik region. From that point onward, any delays in launching the TRIPP project will be perceived much more nervously by Baku and its ally, Turkey.

It cannot be ruled out that possible ultimatums may be followed by military operations aimed at opening the route through Syunik by force. For this purpose, Azerbaijan, with Turkish support, may conduct a two-sided military expansion from Zangilan (Azernaijan’s district that borders Armenia’s Syunik Province to the west) and Nakhichevan, occupying the Meghri district of Syunik.

In 2022, when there was a threat of an Azerbaijani army incursion into Syunik, Iran concentrated around 50,000 troops along its northern borders, sending a clear signal that any change to regional borders is a red line for Tehran and that it is ready to use military force to prevent such developments. Subsequently, Iran opened its Consulate General in Kapan, the regional center of Syunik — a vivid demonstration of how strategically important the 42-kilometer border section with Armenia is for Tehran.

Although the 12-day military clashes with Israel somewhat weakened Iran’s position in the region, it remains difficult to predict how nervously and intensely Tehran would respond if, tired of ongoing delays, Turkey and Azerbaijan carried out a military intervention in Syunik, occupying its southern part. If Iran were to react sharply once again, there could emerge a threat of a large-scale regional war, to which Russia — as Armenia’s ally — would be compelled to respond, regardless of the circumstances.

Specialist in politico-military and security affairs,

Hovhannes Vardanyan

#ARMENIA

21.11.2025 08:36